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The remarkable growth in recent years of franchise contracts as a
means of marketing a variety of goods and services has been accom-
panied by an increase in litigation over franchise terminations. To
date, however, the courts have provided only stopgap protections
against the gravest abuses. Some courts have imposed subjective
good faith limitations and a few legislatures have broached the
area, but the results have not been satisfactory. Behind the
franchise termination situation often lie elementary considera-
tions of fairness which the courts in other contexts have been able
to deal with by expanding established principles of contract law.
The application of these principles to franchise terminations is
the subject of this article.
T HE DISTRIBUTION of goods and services has undergone
remarkable change in recent years. Formerly, manufacturers
distributed their products by selling them to established wholesale
and retail outlets or by relying upon their own distribution systems;
services, other than those connected with the sale of a new product,
were usually provided by independent, unaffiliated firms. Now,
however, manufacturers and producers of services frequently license
independently owned distributors or dealers to market their products.
As a result, the obligations of the manufacturer and dealer as well
as the allocation of any rewards (or losses) between them is today
usually governed by a franchise rather than a sales agreement.'
*Associate Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. 1956, LL.B. 1962, University
of Minnesota.
'While franchise arrangements take many different forms, "in its simplest form,
franchising involves a company with a product or service which arranges for a group
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The termination of a franchise agreement pursuant to a reserved
or implied power 2 poses particularly vexing problems. In drafting
the contract, the parties, apparently concentrating on questions of
performance, often cover the problem of termination only cursorily
or allow the drafting party to impose one-sided conditions without
negotiation." However, once the contract relationship sours, the
parties, or at least the terminated party, suddenly are very interested
in the question of termination rights. For the unwary terminated
party it is usually too late. He may be faced with unexpected and
substantial losses without any apparent remedy. The terminating
party normally can justify his action under reserved or implied
powers to terminate and need not establish any other defense.
As a result, terminated parties often assert a claim based on some
alleged foul play. A dealer who distributes a manufacturer's
product at retail and who may have spent sizable sums promoting
the product may assert that the termination is grossly unfair because
of dealers to handle its distribution. The company with the product, product line
or service is known as the franchisor, and the dealers who acquire the right to sell
the product or service exclusively are known as franchisees." Lawis & HANCOCK, THE
FRANCHISE SYSEMI OF DIS'RIBUTION 1 (1963). (Emphasis omitted.) Many franchises,
however, are non-exclusive. Note, 63 HAlv. L. Rav. 1010, 1016-17 (1950).
The advantages of franchising can be substantial. It "permits the franchisor and
the franchisee to combine the advantages of individual ownership with the efficiencies
attending large-scale operations .... [I]ts explosive growth indicates [that] it may
prove to be the most effective system yet devised to counter the market domination
of the chains." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 8 (1965) [here.
inafter cited as Hearings 1].
It is difficult to overemphasize the size and significance of franchising. There has
literally been a "franchise boom" in the last ten years. Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 690 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 11]; see KURSH, THE FRANCHISE
Booss (1962). Lewis and Hancock note "that there are hundreds of thousands of
franchised businesses in the United States, and they account for a substantial volume of
this nation's retail sales." LEwis & HANCOCK, op. cit. supra at 87. For example, in
1963 there were 338,652 franchise outlets in thirteen major industry groupings alone;
these franchises reported annual sales volume in excess of fifty-nine billion dollars.
Hearings 11 at 690.
2 Although the terms "right" and "power" have been used to distinguish between
contract terminations where the terminating party is not subject to liability for having
ended the contract and those terminations which may result in his liability, Gibbs v.
Bardahl Oil Co., 331 S.W.2d 614, 619 (Mo. 1960), the terms are often used inter-
changeably. See SA ComN, CONTRACTrs § 647 (1960) [hearinafter cited as CORBIN];
Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501, 510 (1924). Hence they will be used
here without ascribing particular significance to the liability of the terminating party.
3 KuasH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 78; see 5 CORBm § 1058, at 339 ("When parties are
making a contract, their attention is centered on the performances that are prom.
ised ....').
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he is saddled with substantial losses or deprived of potential profits
or because the manufacturer reaps an unearned windfall. In addi-
tion, the dealer invariably claims that the real reason for termination
was not the failure of performance alleged but personal animosity
or spite. The dealer's position is usually summed up by the allega-
tion that the termination was not made in "good faith."14
The equities supporting the terminated dealer often seem com-
pelling. His loss may be substantial. His investment of thousands
of dollars may have little value on liquidation when divorced from
the franchise.5 Or, the evidence of intent to injure the dealer may
be overwhelming. In one case,6 the dealer's evidence established
that twenty-one months before the termination the manufacturer's
field manager, upon whose recommendation the decision to terminate
was partially based, warned the dealer that "if its [sic] the last thing
I ever do ... I will get you yet." In another case 7 the court con-
cluded that the dealer had been mistreated when the manufacturer
'See, e.g., Smoky Mountains Beverage Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 182 F. Supp.
326 (E.D. Tenn. 1960); Green Bay Auto Distribs., Inc. v. Willys-Overland Motors,
Inc., 102 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1951), aff'd, 202 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1953). See
also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Jefferson Distrib. Co., 353 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1965); Bruno
v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 865 (Efl. Pa. 1966).
The testimony of Frederick Bauer, a terminated beer distributor, i§ illustrative:
"At the time of cancellation I operated as two closed corporations, one owning real
estate and motorized equipment, the other owning the inventory and related mer-
chandising equipment. In 1946 I started out with capital amounting to $10,000. At
the time of cancellation the real estate corporation had a net worth of $200,000, and
the distributing company one of $185,000. Over the last 10-year period of operation
the net profits of the two corporations, plus the salaries that I drew from them,
averaged over $100,000 annually-that was before Federal taxes. With the cancellation,
I lost the right to sell a going business for a price which such earnings would have
justified. Not only did I forfeit future earnings and goodwill value of the business, but
I had also to accept a fire-sale valuation for real estate and equipment. Having
single-purpose warehouses and equipment, I had no alternative but to accept. Other-
wise, I would have been left with nothing more than two piles of brick and mortar
and a 'junk' yard of motorized equipment." Hearings 11 at 526-27.
0 Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732, 736 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 979 (1965).
7 Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 241 F. Supp. 526, 529-30 (E.D. Tenn. 1965). In both
Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., supra note 6, and Walker the court upheld the manu-
facturer's right to terminate. Neither case, however, directly reflects the status of con-
tract law since the dealer in each sought relief under the Automobile Dealers' Day-in-
Court Act, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964). The terminated auto-
mobile dealers probably relied on the federal act because the possibility of common
law relief seemed remote. See Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integra-
tion by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135, 1149-59 (1957). Nor is the problem of "unfair"
cancellation limited to automobile manufacturers. See, e.g., Hearings 11 at 531-34
(beer distributorship).
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first "advised" him to make unnecessary expenditures and then
terminated the franchise.
Despite such evidence courts have seldom set aside franchise
terminations, examined the terminating party's conduct critically,
or established any criteria of minimum levels of fairness against
which termination provisions should be measured. In response to
the terminated party's indignant cries of bad faith, courts have
woodenly intoned the hackneyed phrases of freedom to contract
theory and held that harsh result or wrongful motivation is irrelevant
since under the contract termination clause the manufacturer had
the "legal right" to terminate. In contrast to the familiar "interpre-
tation" of mass standardized contracts where rules of construction are
frequently corrupted, courts have only occasionally adopted indirect
techniques to curb harsh effects of termination; rather, the unfor-
tunate consequences of termination are condemned in principle but
condoned in practice. The few cases which seem to adopt a good
faith test are likewise devoid of analysis. Neither the effect nor
effectiveness of a subjective good faith limitation on a contract
termination right has been considered. And regardless of the
approach adopted, the courts have not explored or developed the
alternatives available.
The major factors contributing to the dealers' vulnerability are
not difficult to identify. First, there usually is a substantial disparity
between the bargaining power of the dealer and that of the manu-
facturer.8 And the dominant, or at least more powerful, manufac-
turer has not always exercised discretion in the use of its power.9
8 6 CORBIN § 1266, at 57; Hearings II at 617-18. But appearances as to the existence
of substantial economic disparity between the parties can be deceptive. The automobile
industry, for example, has often been cited as "a glaring example of a contract of
adhesion at the time of renewal when the dealer has invested heavily in the business."
Kessler, supra note 7, at 1156; accord, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (preamble to Automobile
Dealers' Day-in-Court Act: "power [is] now heavily weighted in favor of automobile
manufacturers"); Note, 70 HARv. L. R1v. 1239 (1957). Compare Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 335 U.S. 303, 323 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting: automobile dealers are
the "economic dependents of the company whose cars they sell.'). On the other hand,
one economist has suggested that little is really known about the determinants of
the automobile dealers' bargaining position and that, from the evidence of "relatively
low dealer turn-over rates and the relatively high dealer profit rates," one might
properly conclude that "the automobile companies have not been too successful in
overcoming the bargaining position of their established dealers." PASHIGIAN, THE
DISTRIBUTION OF AUTOMOBILEs, AN ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF THE FRANCHISE SYSTEM 35-36
(1961).
'See, e.g., C. Robert Ingram, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 256 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir.
1958) (air conditioners); Motor Car Supply Co. v. General Household Util. Co., 80 F.2d
167, 171 (4th Cir. 1935) (refrigerators); 6 CORBIN § 1266, at 57.
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In the manufacturers' defense, it can be said that they may have been
unable, individually, to control the use of such power since the needs
or demands of competition can be onerous. 10 Second, the dealer has
been handicapped by the anomalous legal classification of the manu-
facturer-dealer relationship; the franchise agreement is neither a sales
nor an agency contract, yet it partakes of both." Despite the obvious
analogy, the manufacturer-dealer relation has little in common with
the relation between a principal and his agent. For example, neither
owes a duty of loyalty to the other, and one may compete with the
other.12 The dealer, in addition, does not take the goods on con-
signment; rather, the manufacturer is a seller and the dealer is a
buyer of the product involved.' 3 Moreover, while the franchise
agreement often specifically excludes an agency relation, 4 rules of
sales law are inapposite because of the continuing relationship be-
tween the parties after the sale of the goods. 15 Consequently, the
rules relating to franchise terminations are often haphazard and are
unrelated either to the needs of the parties or to minimum standards
of fairness.
'
0 See, e.g., Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 214 F. Supp. 222, 226 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
"Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distribs., Inc. v. Drewrys Ltd., 256 Iowa 899, 906-07, 129
N.W.2d 731, 736 (1964); see Mantell v. International Plastic Harmonica Corp., 141 N.J.
Eq. 379, 388-89, 55 A.2d 250, 256-57 (1947).
The franchise agreement, originally labeled a sales agency, is of comparatively recent
origin and fits into no recognized contract category. "Broadly the problem of the sales
agency has been that encountered by every new legal relation, to adapt old rules to
new kinds of contracts, to reconcile somewhat crystallized concepts with the working
needs of modern business." 28 ILL. L. Rnv. 800-01 (1934). See generally HwrTr,
AUTOMOBILE FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS 189-206 (1956).
" E.g., Walpole v. Prefab Mfg. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 472, 230 P.2d 36 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951). However, the agreement precludes such competition if the manufacturer
grants the dealer an exclusive franchise. E.g., Thomas A. Edison, Inc. v. Blackman
Distrib. Co., 66 F.2d 722, 728-29 (2d Cir. 1933); Buckley & Scott Util., Inc. v, Petroleum
Heat & Powcr Co., 313 Mass. 498, 503, 48 N.E.2d 154, 157 (1943).
23 See Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 375 Pa. 422, 100 A.2d 715 (1953); HEwrTr,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 190-91; Lawis & HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 9. But see
Parks v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 262 F. Supp. 515 (D. Conn. 1967).
"1 Hearings I at 405, 414, 436, 446, 453 (sample franchise contracts); Brown & Con-
will, Automobile Manufacturer-Dealer Legislation, 57 COLUM. L. R-v. 219, 220 (1957);
Kessler, supra note 7, at 1140-41 n.37.
"3 See LEwis .9 HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 8-9, 18-56. Nevertheless, some
courts disregard the continuing relationship and the dependencies which arise. What
are essentially franchise agreements are treated as a series of executory contracts en-
forceable only if performance has commenced. E.g., C. C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v.
Long Mfg. Co., 136 N.W.2d 276 (Iowa 1965). Compare Smoky Mountains Beverage Co.
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Tenn. 1960), with Des Moines Blue
Ribbon Distribs. Inc. v. Drewrys Ltd., 256 Iowa 899, 129 N.W.2d 731 (1964). When the
agreement is so construed, the dealer, of course, has no protection against arbitrary
"termination" since he has no "right" to make future purchases from the manufacturer.
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Nevertheless, in contrast to other areas of contract law, only
sporadic attention has been given to the exercise of reserved or im-
plied powers of termination, especially in connection with franchise
agreements."0 The revisers of the sales law sought to establish some
boundaries of fair conduct and contract in connection with contracts
of sale.' 7 Similarly, Congress, in the Automobile Dealers' Day-in-
Court Act,18 sought to mitigate disparity of bargaining power be-
26 The attention given to the question of franchise termination rights has generally
been limited to automobile dealerships and the antitrust implications of franchise
arrangements. The problems peculiar to each of these situations are beyond the
scope of this article; they have been dealt with extensively elsewhere. Automobile
franchises: see generally Freed, A Study of Dealers' Suits under the Automobile Dealers'
Franchise Act, 41 U. DET. L.J. 245 (1964); Kessler, supra note 7; Macaulay, Changing
a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It:
Automobile Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System (pts. I-I1), 1965 Wis.
L. RFv. 483, 740 [hereinafter cited as Macaulay]. Antitrust problems of franchises:
see generally Chadwell & Rhodes, Antitrust Aspects of Dealer Licensing and Fran-
chising, 62. Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1967); Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening
Question in the Sherman Act, 30 U. CI. L. R v. 286 (1963); Comment, 7 B.C. IND. &
CoMm. L. REv. 350 (1966). See also United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 35 U.S.L.
WEEK 4563 (U.S. June 12, 1967); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 35 U.S.L. WEEK 4571
(U.S. June 12, 1967).
Nor is any attempt made here to catalogue the various termination techniques found
in franchise agreements. Others have done so and it seems clear from their findings
that such clauses are as diverse as the products and services involved. E.g., Kutsn, op.
cit. supra note 1, Appendix B at 207-46; LEwis & HANCOCK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 60-
66.
", For example, the term "good faith" is specifically set forth in approximately 50
of the 400 sections of the UCC. But the term is used in the code in two fundamentally
different senses. It is used subjectively to describe a state of mind in connection with
"good faith purchase." On the other hand, it is used objectively in connection with
"good faith performance." In this second sense the term has nothing to do with state
of mind but rather relates to the fairness or reasonableness of the performance.
It is this latter meaning which generally applies to enforcement of sales contracts,
Article 2, and to the general obligation of good faith set forth in § 1-203 in the intro-
ductory section of the code. Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CiI. L. REv. 666, 667-68
(1963); see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J.
1057 (1954).
Modem sales law also distinguishes between "terminations" and "cancellations."
The former is said to occur upon the exercise of a power to end the contract
for a reason other than its breach (and all executory obligations are as a result dis-
charged); the latter describes the situation when either party ends the contract for
breach by the other (and the cancelling party retains his remedy for breach),
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§2-106(3), 2-106(4) [hereinafter cited as UCC]. Useful
as such distinctions may be in drafting statutory provisions, the courts generally use
the terms interchangeably. See Union Tank Car Co. v. Lindsay Soft Water Corp., 257
F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Neb. 1966); Schweinburg v. Altman, 145 App. Div. 377, 384, 130
N.Y. Supp. 37, 42 (1911), aff'd per curiam by equally divided court, 207 N.Y. 681,
101 N.E. 1121 (1913). These terms, however, will be used here without indication of
the potential remedies available to either party to the contract.
170 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1964). Similar "good faith" legislation
applicable to relations between all franchisors and franchised dealers has been intro-
[Vol. 1967:465
FRANCHISE CANCELLATION
tween automobile manufacturers and dealers in regard to termination
conditions and practices. 19 Both statutes impose objective limita-
tions on the exercise of reserved or implied power to terminate.
The Uniform Commercial Code makes limited inquiries into the
fairness or reasonableness of the termination of a sales contract,20 and
the Dealers' Day Act, as interpreted, protects the automobile dealer
from coercion. 21  But neither statute applies to franchises in general,
and neither responds to (or considers) the needs commonly asserted
by terminated dealers. 22
duced in Congress in recent years. H.R. 10113, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) (introduced
by Representative Roosevelt); H.R. 11972, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (introduced by
Representative Kluczynski); H.R. 2818, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (introduced by
Representative Kluczynski). See generally Hearings 11 at 520, 536.
"I H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1956). See generally Kessler, supra
note 7, at 1171-75; Kessler & Stem, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,
69 YALE L.J. 1 (1959); Macaulay 531-53. But see PASHIGIAN, Op. cit. supra note 8.
20 UCC § 2-309 supplies missing terms with respect to the duration of a contract
involving continuing performance; it also requires reasonable notice of termination
regardless of the terms selected by the parties. In addition, § 2-302 broadly designates
the limits of unconscionability which apply to all contract terms. See- discussion at
notes 167-68 infra.
21 Section 2 of the Dealers' Day Act grants an automobile dealer the right to
bring suit against an automobile manufacturer in a federal district court "by reason
of the failure of said automobile manufacturer from and after the passage of this
Act [August 8, 1956] to act in good faith in performing or complying with any
of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in terminating . . . the franchise with
said dealer .... ." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1964). Upon proof of a
manufacturer's violation of the act, the dealer can recover damages sustained because
of the manufacturer's failure to act in "good faith." The term "good faith" is defined
in § 1 (e) of the act to mean that it is "the duty of each party to any franchise, and all
officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in a fair and equitable manner toward each
other so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of
coercion or intimidation from the other party: Provided, That recommendation, en-
dorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or arguments shall not be deemed to consti-
tute a lack of good faith." 70 Stat. 1125 (1956), 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (e) (1964). (Emphasis in
original.)
Although the question was debated in the law reviews, with the exception of two
early district court opinions the courts have unanimously held that the statute does not
protect the dealer from any failure of the manfacturer to act in a fair and equitable
manner but rather protects the dealer only from coercion or intimidation. Macaulay
758-62 (authorities collected). But see Madsen v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 488
(N.D. Ill. 1966).
In addition, at least twenty states have adopted legislation generally limiting the
right of an automobile manufacturer to cancel an automobile dealer's franchise "with-
out due regard to the equities of said dealer and without just provocation .... " E.g.,
Wis. STAT. § 218.01 (3) (a) (17) (1965) (ground for suspension of manufacturer's license);
see Macaulay 517-19 (table 1). Similar legislation has been adopted in approximately
one-third of the states prohibiting brewers from cancelling a beer wholesaler "without
due regard to the equities of such wholesaler, or without regard to just cause or provoca-
tion .... " N.C. GaN. STAT. § 18-69.2(2) (1965); accord, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-
451a (2) (Supp. 1966); see Hearings II at 517, 736.
22 With minor exceptions, terminated automobile dealers have uniformly failed in
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For purposes of this analysis it will be assumed that the dealer's
complaints are in fact true-that is, that the termination will cause
him substantial losses or unjustly reward the manufacturer (or un-
justly impoverish the dealer) and that the termination may be based
in part on bad motives. 23 While it is obviously of paramount sig-
nificance in the individual case to ascertain whether a particular
dealer has or has not been mistreated or should be given relief, it is
even more important that a rational approach be adopted to deter-
mine the appropriate areas and limits of control and relief from
contract abuse. Ad hoc determinations which sometimes achieve
just results by twisting or ignoring standard rules of contract inter-
pretation will never be satsifactory. The legal system itself as well
as occasional results should assure minimum decencies. It will be
suggested here that the direct controls now available in contract law
to limit the inequities otherwise resulting from the rigid application
of common law principles are not wholly adequate. Waiver, estoppel,
and tort theories seem effective for proscribing discriminatory or
fraudulent terminations; but express limits on unfair provisions,
especially in light of circumstances existing at the time of termina-
tion, need further development. The terminating party's motiva-
tion, on the other hand, does not seem to be a desirable or necessary
subject of judicial inquiry as long as the power was exercised reason-
ably.
I
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF IMPLIED AND
RESERVED POWERS OF TERMINATION
As first developed, franchise agreements commonly did not spell
out any provision for termination; terms relating to termination
their efforts to obtain relief under the federal act. Macaulay 742 (Table 2). Despite
their earlier dismal experience with common law contract rules, terminated automobile
dealers may be turning again to state courts and general contract law to obtain relief.
See DeWitt Motor Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., No. 819374, C.P. Cuyahoga County,
Ohio, Oct. 4, 1965 (petition filed). A renewed reliance on general contract law may
result in substantial tests of such rules since there are indications that problems are
increasing among automobile dealers. See Macaulay 817-27; Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 11, 1966, p. 10, col. 3 (Dodge dealers form group to seek changes in franchise
agreement).
2' Although the discussion throughout this article is concerned with the actual or
potential harm to the dealer, it has equal application if the dealer is the terminating
party and the termination causes harm to the manufacturer. Nor is this an unlikely
possibility. In infant industries it is not uncommon for the dealer to be in a much
stronger bargaining position than the manufacturer. See, e.g., Hawrr, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 10-22.
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were implied. The breach of a covenant by one party, in a sub-
stantial and material respect, of course, was treated as a cancellation
of the contract excusing the other party from further performance
and giving him a right to sue for the breach.2 4  Applying rules of
agency, it was usually held that when the contract was for an in-
definite duration, either party had the right to terminate at will.2 5
Cause was not required. Once notice of termination was given, the
contract relationship ended.26
These rules, however, often proved to be inadequate, especially
in the franchise situation. While franchise systems (and agree-
ments) vary widely, certain problems recur. Upon termination sub-
stantial sums invested in the franchise business may be difficult or
impossible to recover.27 Frequently the investment is in one-purpose
facilities (for example, Chevrolet dealer's showroom). Or the spare
parts inventory may have no resale value (for example, Midas Muffler
dealer stock). The manufacturer, on the other hand, may have
staked the success or failure of its operation on the performance of
its dealers as a whole.28 Hence the effectiveness of each dealer is of
paramount significance to it. 9 It is not surprising then that the
24 George H. Hess Co. v. Dawson, 149 Il. 138,36 N.E. 557 (1894) ; Kennedy v. Meilicke
Calculator Co., 90 Wash. 238, 155 Pac. 1043, 1044 (1916).
25 Meadows v. Radio Indus., Inc., 222 F.2d 3472 349 (7th Cir. 1955); Joliet Bottling
Co. v. Joliet Citizens Brewing Co., 254 Ill. 215, 218, 98 N.E. 263, 265 (1912); Garlock
v. Motz Tire & Rubber Co., 192 Mich. 665, 159 N.W. 344 (1916); Fuchs v. Standard
Thermometer Co., 178 Mich. 37, 144 NAV. 484 (1913); Superior Concrete Accessories, Inc.
v. Kemper, 284 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Mo. 1955). See generally 1 Co.BIN § 96. Compare UCC
§ 2-809 (2). But cf. Miler v. 0. B. McClintock Co., 210 Minn. 152, 160, 297 N.W.
724, 729 (1941) ("Courts are inclined to construe a contract so as not to allow a party
to terminate at will without cause.").
26 If the contract were limited to a specific term, however, termination before the
expiration of that period would have to be justified by cause. See E. H. Taylor, Jr.
& Sons v. Julius Levin Co., 274 Fed. 275 (6th Cir. 1921); Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211
N.Y. 187, 195-97, 105 N.E. 217, 220-21 (1914).
27 See Brown & Conwill, supra note 14, at 222; Hearings 11 at 526-27 (quoted note
5 supra). The economic effects of termination on the dealer depend on many factors,
but probably the most significant is whether the franchise grants the dealer an exclusive
territory or not or limits the dealer's sale of competing products. "In one type,
exemplified by the radio industry, the dealer is relatively independent of any one
manufacturer's product, because he sells other kinds of merchandise or because other
producers of the same product compete for his orders. In the other, of which the
automobile industry is the prime example, the dealer has a large investment, centered
almost entirely on retailing and servicing the products of a single manufacturer."
Note, 63 HARv. L. Rav. 1010, 1017 (1950).
28 Macaulay 504; see Duncan, Channels of Distribution for Consumer's Goods, in
MAIM=TNG BY MANUFACrTURERs 142-77 (Phillips ed. 1946).
20 Chrysler Corporation's recovery of a greater share of the automobile market, for
example, is believed to be in part the result of improved dealerships. Sheehan, The
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power to terminate is often expressly reserved in franchise agree-
ments and that questions relating to its exercise are frequently before
the courts.
When spelled out in the agreement, the power to terminate is
usually conditioned on the happening of a specified event, such as
a failure to sell (and hence failure to purchase from the manufac-
turer) a specified minimum number of units. The termination will
be upheld when the party exercising the conditioned power shows
the existence or occurrence of the fact or event constituting the con-
dition. 30 For example, in Union Tank Car Co. v. Lindsay Soft
Water Corp.,31 the dealer agreed to represent the manufacturer in
the sale of its water softeners in return for an exclusive franchise
and the right to advertise the water softeners under their registered
name. The franchise was terminable by the manufacturer if the
dealer failed to meet a purchase-quota requirement of fifty water
softeners each month. Thus, when the dealer sought to avoid the
effects of termination by asserting that the manufacturer had no
reason to terminate the contract, the court only considered whether
the dealer had fulfilled his quota requirement. Since he had not,
the court upheld the termination as being well within the manu-
facturer's rights.3 2
Freedom of Contract Theory
Had the dealer in Lindsay Soft Water questioned the fairness
of the termination condition or the manufacturer's motivation in
terminating the franchise, it is likely that the court would have
reached the same conclusion. It might also have noted its reliance
on common law contract principles "that men should have the great-
est possible liberty to make such contracts as they please"-" and that
neither the effect of the termination nor the manufacturer's motives
should be considered.
Price of Success at Chrysler, Fortune, Nov. 1965, p. 138, at 141-42; Forbes, Septem-
ber 15, 1965, p. 22.
3O Meier Dental Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 237 Fed. 563 (8th Cir. 1916); Dunkelbarger v.
Ladd, 204 Iowa 1208, 212 N.W. 726 (1927); 6 CORmN § 1266; see Johns-Manville Corp.
v. American Hair & Felt Co., 18 Del. Ch. 230, 158 Ad. 141 (Gh. 1931); Nathan Elson &
Co. v. H. Beselin & Son, 116 Neb. 729, 735-36, 218 N.W. 753, 756 (1928).
31257 F. Supp. 510 (D. Neb. 1966).32Id. at 515.
83 M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125 F.2d 949, 962 (2d Cir. 1942)
(Frank, J., dissenting and criticizing the quoted phrase), afl'd, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
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The guiding principle underlying judicial enforcement of con-
tracts is that they are essentially a private concern.34 Paramount
consideration is given to the security of the transaction.35 That is, the
parties' expectations are to be ascertained from the express terms of
the agreement, and they are then to be enforced. Almost total reli-
ance is placed on the self-interest of each party to protect himself
from any attempt by the other to overreach. The free play of the
market is relied on to correct any actual imbalance in bargaining
power; the reasoning is that the parties are free to choose those with
whom they will bargain.36 An oppressive bargain, for example, can
be avoided simply by declining to deal on the proffered basis or
merely by dealing with another.37  Hence neither harsh results nor
improper motivation should be considered in enforcing the exercise
of contract rights.38  Even the exceptions applied when fraud or
duress surround the formation of the contract are explained as
judicial intervention to assure that the parties abide by the rules of
the contest.39
"Under classical contract theory the "unlimited freedom of making promises was
a natural right." Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 456 (1909). The
most famous statement of this view, still the emotional benchmark of the common law
of contracts as applied in the United States, is that made by Sir George Jessel: "[I]f
there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it is that men of
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting,
and that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred
and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice .... [Y]ou have this paramount public
policy to consider-that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract."
Printing & Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, 19 L.R. Eq. 462, 465 (1875); see M.
Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., supra note 33, at 962-66; Hume v. Moore-
McCormack Lines, 121 F.2d 336, 338-47 (2d Cir. 1941). But see Meyer, Contracts of
Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178, 1183-86 (1964).
"rSee Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921); Williston,
Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. Rav. 85 (1919); RESTATE~MENT,
CONThArs §§ 20, 51, 503 (1932). But see id. §§ 55, 504.
86 See Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 CoLumN. L. REv. 629, 630-31 (1943). It is also assumed that the law "cannot possibly
anticipate the content of an infinite number of atypical transactions ...." Id. at 629.
37See Tamm v. Ford Motor Co., 80 F.2d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1935); Motor Car Supply
Co. v. General Household Util. Co., 80 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1935); Ford Motor Co.
v. Kirkmyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001, 1006 (4th Cir. 1933).
88 "However, the gain to one party or the other is not a factor in construing the
contract. If the railway had the right under the contract to stop the contractor's
work, its motive, whether gain or mere petulance of its officers, would not affect its
right.... The question here is determined within the four comers of the railway's
form contract .... " Northern Pac. Ry. v. Twohy Bros., 95 F.2d 220, 223 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 304 U.S. 575 (1938).
"9 That is, freedom of contract theory requires a minimal liberty in both parties to
choose or refuse to enter into the transaction. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L.
REv. 700, 704 (1939).
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The Logical Imperative
The undesirability of applying the absolute freedom of contract
theory, especially in a present-day commercial context, has often been
exposed.40  Nonetheless, rigid applications of the theory beyond the
scope of its premises-that the parties were "equal enterprisers" who
freely negotiated the terms-abound in the case law.41  Freedom of
choice requires, of course, that each party be aware of the choice
available; yet under common law contract theory a party is con-
clusively presumed (absent a showing of fraud, duress, or mutual
mistake) to know the terms of a written agreement and to accept
the consequences which flow from his assent to them.4 2
In connection with termination disputes a logical imperative
has been "developed" in answer to any assertion that the terminating
party acted in bad faith. Simply stated, it is that a manufacturer
cannot be held liable to a dealer merely for having exercised a con-
tract right-the right to terminate-regardless of its motives or the
effects resulting from the termination.43  If the power of termination
"When we turn to the precedents we are met at once with the confusion of state-
ment whether a covenant can be implied only if it was clearly 'intended' by the parties
or whether such a covenant can rest on principles of equity .... One may perhaps
conclude that in large measure this confusion arises out of the reluctance of courts
to admit that they were to a considerable extent 'remaking' a contract in situations
where it seemed necessary and appropriate so to do. 'Intention of the parties' is a
good formula by which to square doctrine with result. That this is true has long
been an open secret. . . . [A] certain sophistication must be recognized-if we are to
approach the matter frankly-where we are dealing with changed circumstances, fifteen
years later, with respect to a contract which does not touch this exact point. .. ."
Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1941) (Clark, J.)
(citations omitted); see Dawson, Economic Duress and the Fair Exchange in French
and German Law, 11 TUL. L. REv. 345 (1937): "The system of 'free' contract described
by nineteenth century theory is now coming to be recognized as a world of fantasy, too
orderly, too neatly contrived, and too harmonious to correspond with reality." Nor is
this skeptical view of freedom of contract theory limited to modern times. In the
middle of the 19th century the theory was attacked as unsound: "It is a popular,
but in my judgment a mistaken, notion that parties ought to be at liberty to enter
into contracts after their own fashion." Mumford v. Gething, 7 C.B. (n.s.) 305, 325-26,
141 Eng. Rep. 834, 842 (1859).
41 Kaplan, Book Review, 63 YALE L.J. 1039, 1041 (1954): "Yet, especially in those areas
of our economy where the old protagonists, the enterprisers of equal strength, have dis-
appeared, contract law tends more than occasionally to work out wrong, and to furnish
the wrong reasons even when it works out right."
42 E.g., Lawrence v. Muter Co., 171 F.2d 380, 384 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied
sub nom. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Muter Co., 337 U.S. 907 (1949); Shulton, Inc. v.
Rubin, 239 Md. 669, 683, 212 A.2d 476, 484 (1965); Ray v. William G. Eurice & Bros.,
201 Md. 115, 125, 93 A.2d 272, 278 (1952).
" "[Sjuch right to terminate was not subject to question on the ground of un-
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is conditioned and the condition has been satisfied, the right to
terminate is absolute; if the termination power is not conditioned
(or is implied), its exercise cannot be questioned.
On the other hand, the legal right theory has been limited by
holdings that a contract right cannot be exercised in an unreasonable
or oppressive manner. The Supreme Court's decision in American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank44 illustrates this limita-
tion. There a Federal Reserve bank had adopted but not yet insti-
tuted a policy designed to force state country banks to join the federal
reserve system by collecting checks drawn on such banks and by
holding them for presentation en masse.4 5 If pursued, this practice
allegedly would have required the state banks to maintain larger
than usual reserves, often beyond their capacity. In upholding the
state banks' petition to enjoin any attempt to follow this policy, the
Court rejected the argument that the holder of a check drawn for
reasonableness, unfairness, lack of good faith, bad faith or because of motive, intent or
resultant detriment to [the terminated dealer]. . . . It is beyond the power of the
judiciary to engraft conditions upon the exercise of such a contractual [termination]
right." Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp. 920, 921 (ED. Mich. 1950). Nor is this
the isolated view of only a few courts. See, e.g., Stimpson Computing Scale Co. v. W. F.
Stimpson Co., 104 Fed. 893, 895-96 (6th Cir. 1900); Zaidan v. Borg-Warner Corp., 228
F. Supp. 669, 671 (ED. Pa. 1964), aff'd, 341 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965);. Rubinger v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 193 F. Supp. 711, 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 310 F.2d
552 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820 (1963); Sharpe v. Great Lakes Steel
Corp., 9 F.R.D. 691, 693 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); General Elec. Co. v. N. K. Ovalle, Inc., 335
Pa. 439, 442, 6 A.2d 835, 837 (1939); cf. 17A C.J.S., Contracts § 413 (1963). Some courts,
moreover, have become virtually immune to questions of fairness and have deliberately
chosen to remain ignorant of the effects of the termination, "without indulging in
observations as to fairness or unfairness of the agreements as to either of the parties."
Myers Motors, Inc. v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp., 178 F.2d 291, 301 (8th Cir. 1949).
Similarly, "in English law there is no overriding general positive duty of good faith
imposed on the parties to a contract." Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CuRREr
LEGAL PROBLEMS 16, 25 (1956).
"256 U.S. 350 (1921) (Holmes, J.). For further proceedings in this case holding
that the Federal Reserve bank in fact neither acted from wrongful purposes nor
accumulated checks wrongfully, see American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve
Bank, 280 Fed. 940 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 284 Fed. 424 (5th Cir. 1922), aff'd, 262 U.S. 643
(1923). Compare First State Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 174 Minn. 535, 219 N.W.
908 (1928).
45 The state country banks charged for "services rendered by them in paying checks
drawn upon them at a distance and forwarded, generally by other banks, through the
mail." 256 U.S. at 355. Federal Reserve banks, in contrast, were required to clear
checks at par. It was this latter policy which the Federal Reserve sought to "force" on
the state country banks by coercing membership; alternatively, the Federal Reserve
wanted the state banks to open nonmember clearing accounts which would also have
required them to maintain larger reserve accounts. The state banks objected because
the loss of income and the diminution of their lending power would drive some of
them "out of business and diminish the income of all." Id. at 356.
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payment over the counter had an absolute right to present all checks
he may hold.
[T]he word "right" is one of the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so
easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise to an un-
qualified one in the condusion. Most rights are qualified.40
Even though the Court noted that a similar case involving private
business would be more difficult to justify than where, as here,
Congress had not sanctioned "this sort of warfare upon the legitimate
creations of the states," the rationale of the holding that a court will
interfere with the exercise of a contract right for improper motives
when done in an unreasonable manner seems equally applicable to
private contracts. This does not mean, however, that the contract
right cannot be exercised, only that its method of exercise must be
reasonable. The opinion emphasized the Federal Reserve bank's
"disinterested malice" in presenting the checks, but the objectionable
feature seems to have been the manner in which the contract right
was exercised.47 Although never expressly applying this rule to a
termination situation, some courts, concluding that the manufac-
turer has a right to terminate, have announced in dictum that exer-
cise of that right cannot be "contrary to equity or good conscience. '48
II
DiRECT LiMrrATIONs ON CONTRACT TERMINATIONS
Despite the simple symmetry and apparent unity of this freedom
of contract theory, courts have long recognized that requiring mini-
mum levels of fairness in contracts is not only desirable but neces-
sary. In this connection, several direct limitations have been im-
posed on the parties' freedom to select the terms on which they can
terminate the contract without liability. On the one hand, there
are rules specifically relating to terminations such as the giving of
do Id. at 358.
,7 The Court did not dispute the ordinary right of holders of bank checks to present
them for payment. But this "right" is balanced, for example, by the knowledge that
banks (as we know them) could not exist if they could not rely on averages and
assume that not more than a certain fraction of their depositors' funds will be de-
manded on any one day. Ibid. Compare Buck v. Latham, 110 Minn. 523, 126 N.W.
278 (1910).
. "Jones v. Chester, 363 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Haley v. Nickels,
235 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); Gable v. Frigidaire Corp., 121 S.W.2d 456,
458 (rex. Civ. App. 1938); Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 23 S.W.2d 333, 338
(rex. Comm'n App. 1930).
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notice to terminate; and, on the other hand, there are rules gen-
erally affecting terminations such as those imposing tort liability
for bad faith conduct which harms the terminated party. In be-
tween these extremes are the direct restraints which relate generally
to contract rights. Unjust enrichment arising from misuse of superior
economic power may be actionable under common law doctrines of
economic duress. Discriminatory terminations may be set aside un-
der doctrines of waiver and estoppel. And termination provisions
which heavily favor one party may not be enforceable because they
are deemed to be unconscionable.
Limitations of Reasonableness
Unless the agreement provides otherwise, a contract of indefinite
duration, whether of agency, employment, or sale (and including a
franchise), is generally held to be terminable at any time.49 In the
employment situation this rule reflects the position of the parties; the
employee usually has not invested any money in the business and is
paid only for services actually performed. 50 A different rule applies,
however, in the case of an agency coupled with an interest, which is
generally held to be irrevocable. 51 This latter rule would seem to
protect against termination a dealer who has given substantial con-
sideration beyond the value of his services. But the opposite is true.
A dealer is not protected because his interest is not the subject of the
franchise but rather is only in the proceeds thereof.52 The dealer's
expenditures are predicated on the assumption that the continuance
of the relationship will repay the investment through profits. 53 How-
ever, if the investment has little value on liquidation, the dealer is
substantially unprotected against sudden terminations, particularly
since the franchise agreement seldom specifies a minimum duration
period.
Seeking to improve the dealer's precarious position, some courts
have borrowed the so-called Missouri doctrine from agency law and
have ruled that franchise agreements involving such a substantial in-
40 E.g., Willcox & Gibbs Sewing Mach. Co. v. Ewing, 141 U.S. 627, 637 (1891); Mere-
dith v. John Deere Plow Co., 185 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936
(1951); Terre Haute Brewing Co. v. Dugan, 102 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 1939); RESrATE-
MENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 118 (1958); cf. UCC § 2-309 (2).
1o But see Note, 42 CoLub,. L. Rav. 107 (1942).
51 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 139 (1958).
r2 Id. § 138, comment b.
53 E.g., Burger Brewing Co. v. Summer, 261 F.2d 261, 262 (4th Cir. 1958).
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vestment by the dealer and existing for an infinite duration cannot be
terminated until after a reasonable period of time has elapsed.54
In other words, the dealer is entitled to a "fair opportunity" to recoup
his expenditures. 55 The time period which provides the dealer a
reasonable opportunity necessarily varies depending on the sig-
nificance of the contract relationship to each party and on the po-
tential harm each may suffer from requiring or not enforcing a mini-
mum period. 56 Corbin's suggestion that the court determine what
5, Apparently originating in Glover v. Henderson, 120 Mo. 367, 877, 25 S.W. 175, 177
(1894), the rule has been applied often in Missouri and elsewhere. E.g., Allied Equip-
ment Co. v. Weber Engineered Prods., Inc., 237 F.2d 879, 882 (4th Cir. 1956); Beebe
v. Columbia Axle Co., 233 Mo. App. 212, 218, 117 S.W.2d 624, 629 (1938). Compare
UCC § 2-309(2). But see Parks v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 262 F. Supp. 515 (D.
Conn. 1967). The manufacturer, of course, retains the power to terminate for cause.
Jack's Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935, 939 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
908 (1956). On the other hand, the doctrine has been applied even though the manu-
facturer's correspondence with the dealer notes on the stationery letterhead that
"Every shipment of beer or ale is an individual transaction. No contracts, agencies or
franchises awarded." Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distribs., Inc. v. Drewrys Ltd., 256
Iowa 899, 905-06, 129 N.W.2d 781, 737-38 (1964). But see Smoky Mountains Beverage
Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 326, 331-32 (E.D. Tenn. 1960). The Missouri
doctrine has also been applied to employment contracts. See Mayhew v. Vanway, 371
S.W.2d 90, 93-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Note, 42 CLUM. L. REV. 107 (1942).
The minimum period necessary for the dealer to have a fair opportunity to recoup
his expenditures may be substantial. Hunt Foods v. Phillips, 248 F.2d 23 (9th Cir.
1957) (sixteen months not a reasonable time); J. C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford,
Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1954) (one year minimum); Hall v. Hall,
158 Tex. 95, 100-01, 308 S.W.2d 12, 16-17 (1958) (three year minimum); cf. Freeport
Sulphur Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 206 F.2d 5, 7 (5th Cir. 1953) (group annuity
option of twenty years).
I' General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 258 N.C. 459, 472, 117 S.E.2d
479, 489 (1960); see Ansbacher-Siegle Corp. v. Miller Chemical Co., 187 Neb. 142, 146-
47, 288 N.W. 538, 541 (1939). A similar rule is applied in regard to expenses incurred
in preparation for operations under the franchise. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684,
685 (D.C. Cir. 1948). An analogous rule provides that the terminated party is entitled
to compensation for performance rendered to the time of termination including
commissions on subsequent sales for which he was the procuring cause. E.g., Greenspan
v. Miller, 111 Ark. 190, 195, 163 S.W. 776, 778 (1914); Metal Structures Corp. v. Bigham,
347 S.W.2d 270, 273-74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961). The supporting rationale again rests
on fairness: "[U]nderlying all the decisions is the basic principle of fair dealing,
preventing a principal from unfairly taking the benefit of the agent's or broker's
services without compensation .... Reed v. Kurdziel, 352 Mich. 287, 294, 89 N.W,2d
479, 483 (1958). But see Ullmann v. May, 46 Ohio L. Abs. 577, 581, 70 N.E.2d 507, 509
(App. 1946), af'd, 147 Ohio St. 468, 475-76, 72 N.E.2d 63, 67 (1947); Barton v. Farm
& Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 109 S.W.2d 233, 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). See also Entis V.
Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1964).
11 General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 258 N.C. 459, 472, 117 S.E.2d 479,
489 (1960): "Among the circumstances to be considered in determining reasonable time
are: The amount of preliminary and promotional expenditures, the length of time
the distributorship has been in operation before notice of termination, what the
prospects for future profits are, and whether it has proven profitable during actual
operation." See Burger Brewing Co. v. Summer, 261 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1958); Gibbs
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is reasonable from the surrounding circumstances which exist at the
time of termination57 rather than when the contract was executed is
gaining support.5s  This test seems preferable since the fairness of
the termination to each party can be measured only in relation to the
facts at the time of termination.
The dealer's protection against termination without any advance
warning is greater because contracts commonly set forth both notice
and notice period requirements. 9 Dealers have seldom complained
that the notice time required or given was too short. In any case,
the question of whether advance notice of termination should be
implied where the parties have not spelled out any conditions on
termination has been raised less frequently than the question of
minimum duration. When the contract is silent, some courts require
that the terminating party give notice a reasonable period in advance
of the actual termination date.6 0 The terminated dealer is entitled,
these courts hold, to such time as is necessary to minimize his losses
by making other arrangements. This period may be restricted, how-
ever, by the terminating party's proof of a countervailing necessity.61
v. Bardahl Oil Co., 331 S.W.2d 614, 621 (Mo. 1960); Nathan Elson & Co. v. H. Beselin
& Son, 116 Neb. 729, 735, 218 N.W. 753, 756 (1928).
'I 3A CoRmN § 684, at 231. Corbin's recommendation was made in connection with
indefinite contracts of employment where the parties also indicated that it was not
terminable at will. His suggestion, however, would appear to have equal application to
franchise terminations.
Is See Entis v. Atlantic Wire & Cable Corp., 335 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1964): "[I]f
the implied promise of the parties is to be reasonable with one another as to
termination, this promise may well be violated by subsequent insistence on terms which
might have seemed reasonable at the moment of contracting but have become unfair
as the relationship developed." Cf. Freeport Sulphur Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 206
F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1953); Bach v. Friden Calculating Mach. Co., 155 F.2d 361, 365 (6th
Cir. 1946). Contra, Hall v. Hall, 158 Tex. 95, 102, 308 S.W.2d 12, 16-17 (1958); cf.
Cheek v. Metzer, 116 Tex. 356, 365, 291 S.W. 860, 864 (1927).
" See, e.g., Ken-Rad Corp. v. R. C. Bohannan, Inc., 80 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1935);
Foster-Porter Enterprises, Inc. v. DeMare, 198 Md. 20, 81 A.2d 325 (1951); KURSH, THE
FRANCHISE BooM Appendix B at 207-46 (1962).
" E.g., J. C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484, 493
(N.D. Cal. 1954) (three months); C. C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long Mfg. Co., 136
N.W.2d 276 (Iowa 1965); California Wine Ass'n v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 20 Wis. 2d
110, 121 N.W2.d 308 (1963) (sixty days); Voechting v. Grau, 55 Wis. 312, 317, 13 N.W.
230, 232 (1882) (dictum); Irish v. Dean, 39 Wis. 562 (1876). See UCC § 2-309 (3). But
ef. Curtiss Candy Co. v. Silberman, 45 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1930). See also Note, 42
COLUM. L. REV. 107 (1942).
"I If the dealer has an exclusive franchise, "the factual necessity for requiring
reasonable notice is greatly enhanced." California Wine Ass'n v. Wisconsin Liquor Co.,
20 Wis. 2d 110, 126, 121 N.W.2d 308, 317 (1963). "The manufacturer should receive
reasonable notice of termination in order to locate another distributor in the area for
his products or to seek other arrangements; the distributor should have reasonable
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As with the question of minimum duration, the minimum advance
notice time should be determined in light of the circumstances exist-
ing at the time of termination, not at the time the agreement was
executed.
The rules of reasonableness, in other words, protect a dealer only
against .sudden terminations (that is, against losses which might be
averted upon reasonable advance notice) and, if the contract is
silent, against terminations shortly after the agreement was executed.
As a practical matter the protection provided by these implied con-
ditions is minimal. In connection with the minimum duration
period of the franchise, manufacturers can avoid the reasonableness
limitation by inserting provisions in the agreement absolving them
of any liability for dealer losses on investment 2 or by specifically
adopting very short minimum duration times; 3 such exculpatory
clauses have been enforced. In addition, no court appears to have
extended the doctrine of reasonableness to give the dealer an oppor-
tunity to recoup any new investment, regardless of when made.
4
notice in order to make the transition from an exclusive distributor to a non-
exclusive distributor or to conduct other transactions relative to his business." Ibid.
When the dealer has only a non-exclusive franchise, the notice period may be less sig-
nificant; for example, the dealer can protect himself against the effects of sudden
termination by the inventory he carries and a court may rely on this fact to reduce
the notice time required. See Burger Brewing Co. v. Summer, 261 F.2d 261, 263 (4th
Cir. 1958).
02 Automobile manufacturers, for example, have successfully relied on contract pro-
visions insulating them from liability for a dealer's "expenditures . . . in preparation
for performance or in performance" of the dealer's obligation. Busam Motor Sales,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 104 F. Supp. 639, 644 (S.D. Ohio 1952), rev'd on other grounds,
203 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1953); accord, Myers Motors, Inc. v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp.,
178 F.2d 291, 801 (8th Cir. 1949); Berry v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir. 1945).
83 See, e.g., Sharpe v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 9 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); Foster-
Porter Enterprisers, Inc. v. DeMare, 198 Md. 20, 81 A.2d 325 (1951); Barish v. Chrysler
Corp., 141 Neb. 157, 3 N.W.2d 91 (1942).
" Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir.
1940) (The "doctrine seemingly [is] not applicable where the relationship has already
endured for some time.').
In addition, Kessler has argued that the Missouri doctrine should be inapplicable to
modern automobile franchises because "unlike the dealership arrangements giving rise
to the Missouri doctrine, a continuing selling contract presumably is selected by tile
dealer himself with full knowledge of its implications. To the extent he was free to
choose a franchise with a denfiite [sic] expiration date, terminable only for cause, lie
should not, having decided against this kind of arrangement, be entitled to claim the
best of all possible worlds." Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integra-
tion by Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1185, 1181 (1957). On the other hand, the presumption
that the dealer had full knowledge of the implications of the contract provisions may
not accord with reality. Similarly, it does not necessarily follow that by exercising
a choice in favor of an indefinite duration contract the dealer should be held to have
relinquished his right to the protection accorded him by an elemental rule of fairness.
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Thus the minimum duration requirement has had no apparent effect
on dealers who have been terminated suddenly some time after the
franchise relationship was adopted. Nor does the inclusion of an
advance notice period automatically protect the dealer against the
effects of sudden termination, even if the termination occurs long
after the agreement has been executed or any new investment made.
The advance notice period agreed to at the time of execution, for
example, may not bear any relationship to the period actually
required to avoid substantial losses.
Tort
Terminated dealers have had only occasional success in relying
on tort theories to recover for a termination based on wrongful
motives. The theoretical framework is not complex. If the wrong
exists independently of the contract, even though based on a contract
right, the terminated dealer can recover.65 The stumbling block to
greater dealer reliance on a tort theory is that recovery will be denied
where the wrong is only a violation of a contract provision.
The problem is illustrated by the following example: 6  Suppose
that A delivers a shirt to B, a tailor, to sew on some buttons.
Upon acceptance of the shirt and agreement on the terms-for repair,
A and B have entered into a contract. But if, instead of mending
the shirt, B negligently destroys it, A has an action in tort for neg-
ligent destruction of personal property. B has violated a duty he
owes to A, a duty not to harm A's personal property, and this duty
exists regardless of the manner in which B acquired control of the
garment or of B's contractual relationship with A (unless the tort
duty is specifically waived).67 In addition, if B destroys the shirt
intentionally by cutting it into shreds, A may be able to recover
05 See Bruno v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 865 (ED. Pa. 1966); cf. Rosenthal
& Doucette, Inc. v. United Last Co., 33 F. Supp. 213, 214 (D. Mass. 1940); Kohnle v.
Paxton, 268 Mo. 463, 472, 188 S.W. 155, 159 (1916).
'6 This example was relied on by the court in Otto v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co.,
277 F.2d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 1960); Peitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956, 961 (8th
Cir. 1944).
67.A, on the other hand, has a contract action not only for breach of the express
agreement to repair, but also for B's violation of the implied covenant "that neither
party will do anything which will destroy or injure the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract." Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp.
12, 21 (D. Ore. 1966); accord, Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79,
87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 235 Ore. 7, 16, 383 P.2d 107,
112 (1963).
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punitive damages (in addition to compensatory damages) upon proof
of B's wrongful motives.68 Similarly, if the termination is so fraudu-
lent as to demonstrate that the terminating party misrepresented his
intentions or otherwise fraudulently induced the terminated party
to enter into the contractual relation, recovery in tort may be
justified on an additional theory.69
On the other hand, if B, in the example of the tailor's contract
to repair the garment, merely fails to sew on the buttons as agreed,
A cannot recover in tort for this violation of their agreement regard-
less of the motive which impels B's refusal to fulfill his obligations.
In that situation recovery in tort cannot be predicated on B's default
of his obligation to repair; B had no duty to mend the shirt in-
dependent of the contract with A. Tort actions by dealers for wrong-
ful terminations often founder on a failure to appreciate this dis-
tinction. 70 For example, in Otto v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co.,71
6" In t eitzman v. City of Illmo, 141 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1944), defendants were under
contract to restore and preserve the city's elevated steel water tank. It was alleged that,
instead of performing such services, the defendants used the contract as a "means
of gaining access to the property," and once access was gained, acted "as wreckers and
destroyers [and] . . . intentionally injured and damaged plaintiff's property." Id. at
961. The court upheld the jury's award of compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
at 962.
The general rule, of course, is that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach
of contract. See 5 CORBIN § 1077, at 438-39.
"Roberts v. Fore, 231 S.C. 311, 314, 98 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1957): "To recover [puni-
tive] damages .... the plaintiff must show that the breach was accomplished with
a fraudulent intention, and was accompanied by a fraudulent act." See Southern Cal.
Disinfecting Co. v. Lomkin, 183 Cal. App. 2d 431, 7 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960) (breach in pursuance of fraudulent conspiracy); Etter v. Von Sternberg, 244
S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (breach concealed by fraudulent misrepresentation).
" See, e.g., Cadillac LaSalle Co. v. Claude Nolan, Inc., 118 Fla. 250, 158 So. 883
(1935); Barish v. Chrysler Corp., 141 Neb. 157, 3 N.W.2d 91 (1942). Thus, "one who
causes intended or unintended harm to another merely by refusing to enter into a
business relation with the other or to continue a business relation terminable at will
is not liable for that harm ...... REsrATEMENT, TORTS § 762 (1939). Comment c to
§ 762 notes that this privilege "exists regardless of the actor's motive for refusing to
enter business relations with the other and even though the sole motive is a desire
to harm the other." Cf. Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 941 (1953) (discharge of employee in retaliation for testimony to
grand jury held to involve only a breach of contract); Christner v. Poudre Valley
Co-op Ass'n, 134 F. Supp. 115 (D. Colo. 1955), af'd, 235 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1956);
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Dubois, 81 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). But see
Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965) (protection
of legal interest is a defense to a tort action for interference with prospective advantage
if defendant proves that his legal interest is equal or superior to interest invaded and
that he acted in good faith); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 214 N.W.
754 (1927).
71277 F.2d 889 (8th Cir. 1960).
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an insurance agency alleged that its franchise had been wrongfully
terminated for spurious reasons as part of a plan by the defendant
insurance company "to purloin the 'block of business' generated" by
the agency.72  By the termination the defendant allegedly sought to
garner the premiums on the renewal business which otherwise would
have been paid the insurance agency. Relying on the analysis that
conduct which is merely a breach of contract is not also actionable as
a tort, the court ruled that
the only wrong alleged is the violation of that provision of the
contract which made the expirations the property of the plaintiff.
No harm independent of the contract is asserted.73
Hence the insurance agency's tort action- for punitive damages was
denied.
In the franchise context then, tort recovery for termination is
probably limited, as a practical matter, to cases where the dealer can
show that the manufacturer's original offer of a franchise was fraudu-
lent.
Economic Duress
Closely allied to this protection against fraudulent termination is
the opaque doctrine of economic duress. Initially applied to restore
payments or transfers made under compulsion of potential bodily
harm, 74 the doctrine has been expanded to include restitution of
value acquired by wrongful acts not otherwise proscribed by legal
rules.75 The primary function of the doctrine of economic duress
is the prevention of unjust enrichment.7 6 Except in a few instances
where relief from duress has been granted on a tort theory, 7 the vic-
7 ld. at 890.
73 Id. at 893; accord, Sterling Colorado Agency, Inc. v. Sterling Ins. Co., 266 F.2d,
472 (10th Cir. 1959).
74 5 WILxSTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1601 (rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
75 See Ross Systems v. Linden Dari-Delite, Inc., 35 N.J. 329, 173 A.2d 258, 263-64
(1961); Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure (pt. 2), 20 N.C.L. REv. 341, 361-62 (1942).
But see Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REv. 253, 287-88
& n.86 (1947). See also Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.,Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753 (2d Cir.
1967).
76 Dawson, supra note 75, at 282-83.
7 See Pittman v. Lageshulte, 45 Ill. App. 2d 207, 195 N.E.2d 394 (1963); Slade v.
Slade, 310 Il1. App. 7.7, 33 N.E.2d 951 (1941); Smith v. Blakesburg Say. Bank, 182 Iowa
1190, 164 N.W. 762 (1917); Neibuhr v. Gage, 99 Minn. 149, 108 N.W. 884 (1906); Long-
bine v. Johnson, 347 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (per curiam).
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timized party usually recovers only the value wrongfully extorted.78
Whether relief is allowed depends on the "wrongfulness" of the act
threatened and on the circumstances in which the threat was made.70
In other words, certain pressures may not be properly applied. In a
few cases, for example, relief has been granted from unduly harsh
contract terms adopted because of unequal bargaining power (even
though no evidence of threats of personal or economic harm was
presented)., 0. Applied to the franchise termination situation, the doc-
trine arguably would protect a terminated party against enforcement
of harsh termination provisions which unjustly enrich the termi-
nating party.
Nevertheless, the cases applying this doctrine are few in number,
and it does not appear to have been relied on in any franchise termi-
nation case."' Hence its application in favor of terminated dealers
seems more potential than real.
Waiver and Estoppel
The relief afforded under the doctrines of waiver and estoppel
is more substantial. The concepts of waiver and estoppel are de-
signed, in a contract termination context, to protect a terminated
party against discriminatory cancellation. 2  Waiver takes place
when one dispenses with the performance of a condition which he
has a right to exact.
'8 That is, no affirmative liability is imposed on the party responsible for the coercion.
5 WILLISON § 1626, at 4547.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 259 F. Supp. 602, 605 (N.D. Okla. 1966); Buhrman
v. International Harvester Co., 150 N.W.2d 220 (Neb. 1967). See also Dawson, Duress
Through Civil Litigation: I, 11, 45 MICH. L. REv. 571, 679 (1947). See generally 5
WILLISTON § 1606 n.l.
so Gierth v. Fidelity Trust Co., 93 N.J. Eq. 163, 115 At. 397 (Ct. Err. & App. 1921);
Berg v. Hoffman, 275 N.Y. 132, 9 N.E.2d 806 (1937), reversing 249 App. Div. 913, 292
N.Y. Supp. 721 (1937). See also Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. W. E. Hedger Transp. Corp.,
167 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948); RESTATEMENT, CONTECrs § 493,
comment e (1932).
81 See Buhrman v. International Harvester Co., 150 NAV.2d 220 (Neb. 1967).
On the other hand, the concept of economic duress underlies statutory and common
law doctrines prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade. For example, a manu-
facturer or distributor of products or services usually has the right to select the
outlets or persons with which it wishes to deal. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300 (1919). But if a distributor exercises a contract "right of cancellation" for the
purpose of eliminating a competitor, that exercise may violate the antitrust laws and
may be enjoined. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 468.69
(1962).
"' See 3A CORBIN § 752; cf. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
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[It] occurs where one in possession of any right .... with full knowl-
ledge of the material facts, does or forbears to do something, the
doing of which or the failure or forbearance to do which is incon-
sistent with the right or his intention to rely upon it.s3
In the termination situation, estoppel involves the additional factor
of reasonable reliance. That is, the party who dispensed with the
performance of the condition will be estopped to assert the condi-
tion if he had reason to foresee that the other party would materially
change his position in reliance and this in fact occurred.
8 4
Applied to a franchise termination situation, questions of waiver
and estoppel often arise in the following context: Under the terms
of the franchise agreement, the manufacturer usually has the right to
terminate the dealer upon the occurrence of any of several condi-
tions.8 5 If the dealer's business is a highly personal one, for example,
the franchise may be terminable on the death of or transfer of stock
by the major stockholder of the franchise who also manages the
business.8 6  If relative performance is significant, the manufacturer
may reserve the power to terminate the dealer if his sales fall below
the average sales of those dealers in his area who are similarly
situated. 7 Or, if the dealer's success depends in part on his ability
to display the manufacturer's wares-that is, on his facilities and in-
83 Ford v. Culbertson, 158 Tex. 124, 138-39, 808 S.W.2d 855, 865 (1958), quoted with
approval in Surko v. Harrison, 391 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
8' Nathan Miller, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 42 Del. 523, 528, 39 A.2d 23, 25 (Super.
Ct. 1944). For example, in Laverty v. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co., 140 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa
1966), a contract of automobile insurance could not be cancelled for late payment be-
cause of the insurer's custom of accepting delayed payment of premiums, a practice
known to and relied upon by the insured. Estoppel, the court pointed out, is based
on the idea that where one has relied on the conduct of the other party the latter should
not be permitted to change his position to the prejudice of the former.
Waiver, in other words, is premised upon the voluntary action of the promisor.
Poray v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 90 NJ. Super. 454, 460, 217 A.2d 916, 919 (1966).
Estoppel, in contrast, requires action or forbearance by both parties. Nathan Miller,
Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., supra. This distinction also affects the restoration of a condi-
tion which has been waived or which a party is estopped from asserting. The party
waiving a condition can restore it by giving notice to the other; an estopped party,
however, cannot re-establish the condition without the concurrence of the other party.
See 3A CORBIN §§ 752, 764.
85 See generally KUaSH, op. cit. supra note 59; Hearings I at 403-55, 458-59.
403-55, 458-59.
88 See Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 144 A.2d 123 (1958); Macaulay 568
n.449.
87 See Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896
(1963); Sam Goldfarb Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 214 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich.
1962); Macaulay 566-67.
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ventory-the franchise agreement may permit termination whenever
the dealer's net working capital falls below a specified amount. s8
The possibilities are as endless as the potential conditions upon which
termination can hinge. Whatever the condition, if the manufacturer
seeking to terminate has not enforced its right when these conditions
previously "ocurred"-either in connection with the dealer to be
terminated or in regard to other dealers similarly situated-an argu-
ment can be made that the manufacturer has waived its right to
terminate or is estopped from asserting the right.
The waiver contention relies almost entirely on the discrimina-
tory aspect of the manufacturer's conduct. Even though the dealer
can show no change of his position because of the manufacturer's
earlier failure to exercise the right, nevertheless, he relies on the
unfairness of allowing the manufacturer to enforce the right against
him in the present situation. For example, the dealer may offer proof
that the manufacturer has not required him to meet his assigned
quota in the past or that he has not forced other dealers to do so.9
As a practical matter, however, such arguments have seldom been
accepted because the courts have been unwilling to find that the
manufacturer's prior action or inaction was "inconsistent" with the
exercise of the right.90 The courts have also been reluctant to grant
the dealer relief, fearing that they might become involved in an un-
manageable investigation of the relationships between the manu-
facturer and all of its other dealers. 91
Although the ground rules of estoppel are similar to those of
waiver, its application does not necessarily involve the same problems.
When the terminated dealer alleges that the manufacturer is estopped
3 See Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645, 648 (3d Cir.
1964); Garvin v. American Motors Sales Corp., 318 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1963); Augusta
Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Sales Corp., 213 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ga. 1963);
Macaulay 567-68.
"1 Madsen v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 488, 492 (N.D. Ill. 1966); cf. Union Tank
Car Co. v. Lindsay Soft Water Corp., 257 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Neb. 1966). Similar
reasoning supports the application of waiver principles in requiring, upon breach of a
covenant, that "a party to a contract should promptly exercise a right to terminate a
contract." Zelinger v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 316 F.2d 47, 53 (10th Cir. 1963);
Nathan Elson & Co. v. H. Beselin & Son, 116 Neb. 729, 734-35, 218 N.W. 753, 755-56
(1928); 3A CORBIN § 755; 3 WsviwsrON § 688; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 309 (1932).
90 See, e.g., Globe Motors, Inc. v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 328 F.2d 645, 648
(3d Cir. 1964); 3 WILsrON § 678, at 1958-59.
$' This attitude is evident in Smoky Mountains Beverage Co. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 182 F. Supp. 326, 331 (E.D. Tenn. 1960); Des Moines Blue Ribbon Distribs., Inc. v.
Drewrys Ltd., 256 Iowa 899, 914, 129 N.W.2d 731, 740 (1964).
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from terminating the contract on the ground asserted, the question of
proof revolves around whether the terminated dealer can show (1)
that he changed his position -9 2 in reliance on the manufacturer's
conduct and (2) that such reliance was reasonable.9 3 The difficulty
of proving that the manufacturer has taken an "inconsistent" posi-
tion, often an insurmountable roadblock for the dealer asserting a
waiver defense, may be overcome by evidence that the manufacturer
knew of the dealer's change of position and failed to object.
Thus, a manufacturer seeking to terminate a dealer for failure
to meet a minimum sales quota may be estopped from asserting the
dealer's inadequate sales on the ground that the manufacturer dis-
criminated against the dealer in allocating products.94 Likewise, a
dealer's inability to meet a net working capital requirement may not
create a condition supporting termination despite explicit provisions
in the franchise agreement to the contrary. The manufacturer's
representatives may have assured the dealer that this contract re-
quirement need not be met. Proof that the dealer reasonably relied
on such assurances and therefore did not seek additional capital
would prevent the manufacturer from asserting the working capital
condition as a justification for termination.95
Although this analysis has concentrated on express conditions,
the rules of waiver and estoppel have equal application to implied
termination conditions. In any case, when examined together, the
rules of waiver and estoppel appear to be effective judicial checks on
discriminatory terminations. They do not, however, impose any
other limits of fairness on franchise terminations.
,
2 A change of position, of course, includes any failure to take action or to protect
an interest because of assurances, express or implied, that such action is necessary.
Triple Cities Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 4 N.Y.2d 443, 448, 151 N.E.2d 856, 858
(1958); Moar v. Beaudry, 62 Wash. 2d 98, 105-06, 381 P2d 240, 245 (1963).
03 3 WLLJrSTON § 692. Shinabarger v. United Aircraft Corp., 262 F. Supp. 52, 63 (D.
Conn. 1966): "Conduct sufficientiy inequitable to warrant invoking the doctrine of
equitable estoppel need not amount to actionable fraud or deceit." See id. at 63 n.24
(collecting authorities).
"1 Southern Rambler Sales, Inc. v. American Motors Corp., 375 F.2d 932, 935-36 (5th
Cir. 1967); Blenke Bros. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 189 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (N.D.
111. 1960) (dictum). Or, if market quotas for different dealers were determined by
different standards under the same contract language, the manufacturer might be
estopped from terminating the dealer for failure to meet such a quota. See Milos v.
Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712, 716-17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).
Cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 273-74, 144 A.2d 123, 128-29 (1958).
Compare Alfieri v. Willys Motors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 627, 629 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
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Unconscionability
Historically, courts of equity have refused, under the label of
unconscionability, to enforce contract terms "such as no man in his
senses and not under delusion would make on the one hand, and as
no honest and fair man would accept on the other."98  But few
contracts sink to such madman levels, and the doctrine of unconscion-
ability is seldom applied in a commercial context.96" Instead of
venturing to expand the coverage of the doctrine as business mores
have improved, courts have tended to recite freedom of contract
theory while recognizing economic realities only in some cases by
construing terms so as to limit the worst forms of unfairness. 9 As a
result, the doctrine of unconscionability has been little more than a
generic concept applicable to various fact situations.98 Another con-
sequence is that the courts have not developed either minimum
standards of fairness or rational rules for the application of any
standards,99 particularly in regard to dealings between manufacturers
and dealers.
Only in the area of standardized contracts offered by dominant
sellers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis have the courts even started to
reflect the persistent suggestions of several commentators 00 that some
98 Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (Ch.
1750); see Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 415 (1889).
9" See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485, 42841 (1967).
97 Note, 57 YALE L.J. 1161, 1163 (1949); see Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HAtv. L. REv.
700, 702 (1939).
98 The oppressive terms are seldom the sole basis for decision; usually some species
of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, mistake, incapacity, undue influence or gross in-
adequacy of consideration has also been found and relied upon. See, e.g., Pope Mfg.
Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83.84
(3d Cir. 1948); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378
(1918).
Moreover, it cannot be said definitely whether unconscionability was recognized as
a defense at law. Compare Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,
448-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965), with United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 325-
30 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 414-15
(1889). See 1 CORBIN § 128; Stevens, A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles
and Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 351, 366-69 (1956). See also Note, 45 IowA L. Rav.
843, 846-47 (1960); 54 GEo. L.J. 703, 704 (1966); 41 WASH. L. REv. 621, 622 (1966).
09 LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALs 364-65, 367 (1960).
100 1 d. at 365-71; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLum. L. Rav. 629 (1943). See also Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the
Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178, 1180 (1964). See generally Wil-
son, Freedom of Contract and Adhesion Contracts, 14 INT'L & Comp,. L.Q. 172 (1965).
Suggestions for the enforcement of minimum standards, moreover, have not disregarded
the substantial advantages and desirable aspects of standardized contracts. Llewellyn,
Book Review, 52 HAv. L. REv. 700, 701 (1939).
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standards of fair dealing should be enforced. But only gross forms
of unfairness are affected, and relief is usually limited to relieving
unsuspecting consumers or uninformed sellers who have been tricked
by the unscrupulous.
Thus, in the leading case of Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz,1' 1
the court refused to order specific performance of an agreement to
supply carrots where the canner had, by clever draftsmanship, allo-
cated virtually all risks to an economically inferior grower. By the
agreement the grower sought security against a severe drop in prices.
In fact the agreement shielded only the canner against this con-
tingency since the canner was not obligated to purchase carrots if
it was unable to receive or handle them "because of any circum-
stances beyond [its] ... control." 10 2 The canner, in other words, had
not agreed to buy carrots if demand declined and production dropped
(which would normally occur when prices fell), and the grower was
still vulnerable to the very hazard against which he had sought
protection. 103 This, according to the court, went "too far," especially
in light of other one-sided terms which characterized the agree-
ment.10 4 Similarly, in the recent but already well-known decision in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 0 5 a state court refused to
sanction a unilateral attempt by automobile manufacturers to limit
their liability in the standard contract of sale offered new car buyers
by severely limiting their express warranty and disclaiming all
others. 0 6
101 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948).
102 Id. at 83 n.11.
103 See Note, 58 YA L.J. 1161, 1167 & n.28 (1949).
204 The court emphasized the following one-sided provisions: "Carrots are to have
their stalks cut off and be in clean sanitary bags or other containers approved by
Campbell ....
"The next paragraph allows Campbell to refuse carrots in excess of twelve tons to
the acre. The next contains a covenant by the grower that he will not sell carrots to
anyone else except the carrots rejected by Campbell nor will he permit anyone else to
grow carrots on his land. Paragraph 10 provides liquidated damages to the extent of
$50 per acre for any breach by the grower. There is no provision for liquidated
damages ... for breach of contract by Campbell." 172 F.2d at 83.
105 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
108 Both Henningsen and Campbell Soup can, of course, be distinguished from
the usual situation when a franchise agreement is before the courts. Henningsen
involved a disclaimer of liability in a consumer sales contract whereas a franchise
agreement invariably is between two merchants. Campbell Soup, on the other hand,
was an action for specific performance, and the court specifically noted that, had the
action been at law, its decision would have been different; equitable defenses, however,
are of little aid to the dealer since he will usually be the applicant for relief. See note
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The Campbell Soup decision is, on the other hand, an example of
why courts are often justifiably reluctant to expand the scope of the
unconscionability doctrine. As applied, the doctrine has a tendency
to over-correct the evil; in Campbell Soup its effect is more accurately
described as "overkill." Denial of specific performance of an output
contract for agricultural products was likely to cause irreparable
harm to the buyer;10 7 hence limiting the canner's remedies to a
damage recovery was likely to be as unfair to the canner as the
original contract was to the grower.10 8 A more reasonable solution,
consistent with the intentions of the parties, would have been to
"rewrite" the contract to protect the grower against a fall in prices
yet assure the canner of a source of supply. This could have been
accomplished simply by striking the one-sided terms and enforcing
the contract as modified.
10 9
In any case, the doctrine of unconscionability has not generally
been applied to limit the harsh effects of franchise terminations.
When termination provisions are challenged, courts invariably find
them "fair and reasonable," even when such provisions theoretically
empower the manufacturer to dismiss fifty per cent of its entire
dealer force at any time."10 While perhaps not sinking to madman
108 infra. Nevertheless, these decisions do seem significant as an indication of increased
judicial liberality in finding unconscionability.107Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 732, 779-82 (1963). See Hunt Foods, Inc. v. O'Disho, 98
F. Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Paullus v. Yarbrough, 219 Ore. 611, 643, 347 P.2d 620,
635 (1959).
2-The court's observation that the contract was not illegal and that the canner
could maintain an action at law for damages seems misleading. The contract applied
to fifteen acres of land and involved approximately 100 tons of carrots. The liquidated
damages provision of the contract limited damages to fifty dollars per acre; thus the
ceiling on the canner's damage recovery was 750 dollars. But the canner's losses were
much greater. If his damages are the difference between the contract price (thirty
dollars per ton) and the market price (ninety dollars per ton) at the time of delivery
(i.e., the time of breach), see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 329 & comments b, d (1932),
his damages were approximately 6,000 dollars. Nor is this result-that denial of
equitable remedies is, in effect, a denial of relief-unique. See Frank & Endicott,
Defenses in Equity and "Legal Rights," 14 LA. L. REv. 380 (1954).
109 See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 560, 566 n.34 (1954); UCC § 2-302 & comment. Following
the New Jersey court's decision, the canner apparently modified its contracts with
growers and eliminated all provisions which had been found objectionable. Thus,
when the canner sought specific performance three years later under the revised
contract, another court granted the relief sought. Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, Ill
F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
210 E.g., Victory Motors of Savannah, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 357 F.2d 429
(5th Cir. 1966); Milos v. Ford Motor Co., 317 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 896 (1963); Sam Goldfarb Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 214 F. Supp. 600
(E.D. Mich. 1962); A. F. L. Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 183 F. Supp. 56
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levels, it can be questioned whether judicial approval of such
provisions meets minimum concepts of fairness. Moreover, by
restricting the doctrine of unconscionability to the contract terms
rather than its effects, courts have not directly considered its appli-
cation where termination provisions reasonable when executed cause
unexpectedly harsh results.
III
INDIRECT LIMrTATIoNs ON CONTRACT TERMINATIONS
When the rules of contract law fail to provide relief from the
harsh results of freedom of contract theory, courts have often gone
beyond expressions of "grave concern" and used (or misused) rules
of construction to aid the abused party."' Llewellyn, for example,
has spelled out the extensive judicial reliance on indirect methods
to reach just results in regard to contracts of adhesion. 1112 In en-
forcing the boilerplate of mass standardized or form-pad contracts,
courts have constantly relied on such "semi-covert techniques" as
misconstruing patently clear language (by the discovery of ambiguity
which is then construed against the dominant party), finding in-
consistencies (which are then decided against the drafting party
by throwing out the clause favoring him), and artificially applying
the doctrines of mutuality and consideration."I
In contrast to these interpretations of contracts of adhesion, how-
ever, termination powers in franchise agreements have seldom been
subjected to such methods of construction even when the manufac-
turer has in fact dictated all of the terms." 4  At one time courts
did rely on the requirement of mutuality to find a failure of consid-
(E.D. Wis. 1960). Contra, Madsen v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 488, 506 (N.D. Ill.
1966). See text accompanying notes 181-85 infra.
1 1 1
-[W]e owe a great debt to the empiricism and lack of clear thinking of judges
which have saved us from some of the logical consequences of their professed prin-
ciples [of freedom of contract]." Kaplan, Book Review, 63 YA1. L.J. 1039, 1040
(1954).
1 12 LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEAis 362-71 (1960);
Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HA~v. L. REv. 700 (1939).
"'1 See Note, 109 U. PA. L. RaEv. 401, 408-13 (1961); Note, 58 YArE LJ. 1161, 1163-64
& nn.8-11 (1949); cf. Note, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1215-16 (1965).
114 The automobile franchise cases prior to the 1956 federal law (see note 21 supra
and accompanying text) are the dearest illustration of this anomaly. Strictly applying
common law contract principles, the courts invariably upheld the manufacturers'
terminations of their dealers. See, e.g., Note, 70 HARv. L. Rv. 1239, 1241-42 (1957).
But cf. Buono Sales, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 363 F.2d 43 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 971 (1966).
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eration, especially when the franchise agreement was terminable at
will.115  But more often than not the application of this rule was
invoked by manufacturers to avoid obligations under the contract;
hence it tended to work to the detriment of the terminated dealer.116
In any case, the doctrine has little application today because of the
willingness of the courts to find consideration and because of the
general practice of conditioning termination rights on the occurrence
of specified events. 1 7
A few courts have employed a rule of construction which can
favor terminated parties and which provides that the ostensible
reason given for exercising the power of termination cannot be
changed.1" 8 For example, if a franchise agreement is terminable on
any of several grounds, the manufacturer cannot notify the dealer
that he is being terminated for inadequate sales and, when challenged,
assert instead that the termination was justified under a contract
provision permitting termination upon failure to provide exclusive
representation."19  Analytically, this approach is unsound. 20  It is
based on fairness to the terminated party, yet fairness as such is un-
related to a change of reason. The original reasons given would
appear immaterial so long as the terminated party has not relied
upon them.' 2 ' Moreover, if the reason given relates to performance
115 E.g., Superior Motor Co. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 112 Kan. 522, 212 Pac. 100
(1923); Note, 31 CoLUM. L. REV. 830 (1931); 28 ILL. L. REv. 800 (1934).
1116 See 28 ILL. L. REv. 800, 804-06 (1934).
11, The turning point on the question of mutuality appears to have been the argu-
ment of Professor Corbin that the provisions of the franchise agreement and the
acts of the parties were consistent only with a contract imposing reciprocal conditions
and binding the parties to some extent. Corbin, The Effect of Options on Considera-
tion, 34 YALE LJ. 571, 585-89 (1925). By 1940 most courts rejected the argument that
the contract was void for lack of mutuality even if it was terminable at will. E.g.,
Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1940);
Buggs v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F.2d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 1940); Kane v. Chrysler Corp.,
80 F. Supp. 360, 362 (D. Del. 1948); Stem & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 148 Conn.
527, 172 A.2d 614 (1961). But see Parks v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 262 F. Supp.
515, 518-19 (D. Conn. 1967).
118 "When a party to a contract elects to cancel it under one or more alternative
provisions conferring such a privilege, he should assign his cause and abide by it.
He cannot assign one cause and cancel it, then, after being sued for wrongful can-
cellation, come into court and say he may have erred in respect of the cause assigned,
but another cause does exist, and he is not liable." Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding,
42 F.2d 440, 445 (4th Cir. 1930); accord, Kiker v. Bank Say. Life Ins. Co., 37 N.M. 346,
23 P.2d 366 (1933).
:1 Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding, supra note 118.
120 See RSTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 454, comment a (1958).
121 3A CoRBiN § 762, at 524-26.
(Vol. 1967:465
FRANCHISE CANCELLATION
and the agreement confers upon the terminated party an opportunity
to cure any failure in performance, established principles of estoppel
protect against an unreasonable change of grounds.122 In addition,
this rule of construction is easily avoided by the draftsman. The
termination clause can be rewritten to eliminate the requirement that
the terminating party spell out in the notice the basis for its decision;
notice is all that is then required.123
As the history of mutuality and the description of the "changing
grounds" rule illustrate, a terminated dealer can find little comfort
in indirect judicial techniques to control termination abuse. Ter-
mination clauses have not generally been misconstrued or found to be
inconsistent with other provisions in the contract for the purpose of
protecting the weaker, terminated party. In fact, when challenged,
the terminating party has usually been the victor regardless of his
motive or of the effect of the termination on the parties.
IV
THE GOOD FAITH TEST AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR RULES
DESIGNED TO LIMIT UNFAIR BARGAINS
As a logical aftermath of their failure to prevent unfair results
within the confines of freedom of contract theory or under either
direct or indirect techniques for controlling termination abuse,
terminated parties have argued that a good faith limitation should
be imposed on the exercise of reserved and implied powers of ter-
mination. Disregarding the comforts of the legal right approach and
not bothering to consider the remedies available under other rules, a
few courts have agreed.124  Good faith is used subjectively in this
context. 25  It would apply to terminations for wrongful motives
222 E.g., Brush-Swan Elec. Light Co. v. Brush Elec. Co., 41 Fed. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1890).
"
21 See Wood Motor Co. v. Nebel, 238 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1951).
211- See, e.g., Busam Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F. Supp. 790, 796 (S.D.
Ohio 1949), appeal dismissed, 185 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1950); R. J. Cardinal Co. v. Ritchie,
218 Cal. App. 2d 124, 145-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 545, 558-59 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Chrysler
Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 284, 144 A.2d 123, 134, rehearing denied, 51 Del. 295,
297, 144 A.2d 885, 886-87 (1958); Quick v. Southern Churchman Co., 171 Va. 403, 417,
199 S.E. 489, 495 (1938).
a25 The term "good faith" is often used in the interpretation and enforcement of con-
tracts. For example, "every contract implies good faith and fair dealing between the
parties to it." Simon v. Etgen, 213 App. Div. 589, 595, 107 N.E. 1066, 1067 (1915).
Thus, each party must perform fairly and in good faith. Henry G. Meigs, Inc. v. Em-
pire Petroleum Co., 171 F. Supp. 888, 892-93 (E.D. Wis. 1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 424 (7th
Cir. 1960); Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 210 N.Y. 235, 242, 104 N.E. 622, 624 (1914).
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which cause the terminated party to suffer substantial losses or to
lose profits or which result in unearned windfalls to the terminating
party. As such. it would be a substitute (or additional weapon) for
other direct controls on harsh bargains.
Before such a substitute is adopted, however, two questions must
be considerered. First, is the proposed limitation likely to redress
the wrongs suffered by the terminated parties? That is, would appli-
cation of a good faith test protect terminated parties against the un-
fair consequences of bad faith terminations? Second, even if such
a test were effective, is a more attractive alternative available? For
example, can the same objectives of preventing unfair terminations
be obtained by wider enforcement of the doctrine of unconscion-
ability; or, if that doctrine is inadequate, could it be modified so as
to fulfill this need?
A review of the good faith cases is a necessary predicate to this
analysis. The question of whether a terminating party acted in good
faith appears to have been raised first in connection with the criteria
adopted in enforcing employment contracts and later in connection
with sales or service contracts. Currently the good faith dispute
seems to be centered in the area of franchise agreements. The issue
has arisen in both employment and sales contracts where clauses
requiring performance to the "satisfaction" of the employer or
buyer require interpretation. The question, simply stated, is: How
should the terminating party's lack of satisfaction be proved-by
asking the terminating partymerely to express his judgment or by
requiring him to be honestly (that is, subjectively) or reasonably
(that is, objectively) dissatisfied?
And recovery for substantial performance (as contrasted with strict performance) is
granted only when the claimant made a good faith effort to perform. E.g., Handy
v. Bliss, 204 Mass. 513, 519, 90 N.E. 864, 865 (1910); Ashley v. Henahan, 56 Ohio St.
559, 569, 47 N.E. 573, 575 (1897); Garland Grain Co. v. Bailey, 393 S.W.2d 945, 948
(Tex. Civ. App. 1965). But except in connection with the concept of good faith pur-
chase and negotiable instruments, see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good
Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954); Note, 51 VA. L. Rxv. 1342 (1965), or in
regard to dealings where one party stands in a fiduciary relation to the other, Austrian
v. Williams, 103 F. Supp. 64, 75 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 98 F.2d 697 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 909 (1952); compare Note, 74 YALE L.J. 338 (1964), good
faith is usually measured by objective standards. See cases cited note 124 supra. So
strong is this approach that even in cases of unilateral mistake the courts have com-
monly resorted to a doubtful application of the mutual mistake doctrine to avoid
the harsh results of an objective approach to mutual assent. Note, 23 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 143 (1948).
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Satisfaction as a Contract Condition
The cases involving satisfaction terms, as covenants or conditions,
are legion and the results often irreconcilable.'- Corbin, for ex-
ample, suggests that the interpretive test to be adopted may depend
on whether the covenant or condition is discharged either when per-
formance has not been "satisfactory" or when it has not met the
terminating party's "personal satisfaction."1 27  But most decisions
rely on other criteria for construing satisfaction terms. The ap-
proach selected depends more on the type of contract involved than
the specific satisfaction terms of the contract.
Employment contracts typically are for an indefinite term, but
continued employment is often subject to the satisfaction of the
employer. In this situation the question of how to interpret the
satisfaction condition has revolved around whether to adopt the sub-
jective test. Some jurisdictions hold that the employer is the sole
judge of his dissatisfaction; 12 others conclude that the trier of fact
should determine whether the lack of satisfaction was honestly
held.129 Under the first approach, the employer's expressed judgment
cannot be questioned by court or jury; under the second, the em-
ployer's judgment must be upheld unless it is found that his dis-
satisfaction was feigned. Under either test the termination need not
be reasonable, although the unreasonableness of the employer's
dissatisfaction may be some evidence that it was contrived.
Different standards have been applied to test the promisee's
lack of satisfaction as a condition for terminating a sales or service
contract. Such contracts are common. Merchandise, for example,
is often sold with a privilege of return if "the buyer is not satisfied"
1
8 For a collection of some of the satisfaction cases, see Annot., 6 A.L.R. 1497
(1920) (non-professional employment contracts); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1058 (1932) (option
to renew lease); Annot., 167 A.L.R. 411 (1947) (sales conditioned upon third-party
approval); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1114 (1955) (private building or construction); Annot., 47
A.L.R.2d 455 (1956) (title or land sale contracts); Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 200 (1962) (sale
of goods).
As used in these discussions, "satisfaction" contracts include agreements using similar
terms to express a satisfaction condition. E.g., Wilbur v. Bingham & Phelps, 3 OHIO
C.C.R. 459, 2 Ohio C.C. Dec. 262 (1888) (goods to "suit" buyer); Hartford Sorghum
Mfg. Co. v. Brush, 43 Vt. 528 (1871) (buyer to "like" goods).
227 3A CORBIN § 644.
228 E.g., Comerford v. International Harvester Co., 255 Ala. 576, 178 So. 894 (1958);
Crawford v. Mail & Express Publishing Co., 165 N.Y. 404, 57 N.E. 616 (1900).
129 E.g., Edwards v. Doherty, 74 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1954); Hazen v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151,
117 So. 853 (1928).
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or if the goods "are not satisfactory." Service contracts are similarly
conditioned. The test of satisfaction in these circumstances depends
not on whether the contract involves sales or services, but rather on
the availability of commercial standards. If the purchaser of an
artist's portrait is not satisfied, his personal judgment is usually con-
trolling.130 But the motives of the allegedly dissatisfied watch repair
customer are irrelevant in testing his lack of satisfaction. The
promisee is deemed to be satisfied if a reasonable man would have
been satisfied with the operation of the watch.131 The common
thread of these cases is that a subjective test of satisfaction is usually
applied when the condition involves personal taste, and objective
criteria control when the existence of the condition is measurable by
commercial standards.13 2
Despite substantial differences in the various situations in which
subjective criteria are applied, terminated franchisees invariably have
relied upon these cases to argue that a good faith limitation requiring
pure motives by the terminating party should be imposed on the
right to terminate. 33 This reliance seems misplaced. The adoption
of a subjective test in the employment situation appears to be the
result of various factors: the personal nature of the employment rela-
tion; the lack of acceptable objective standards; and a judicial re-
luctance to allow the trier of fact to substitute his judgment for
that of the employer as to what the needs of the business require.
Nor do the sales and service contract cases support a dealer good
faith argument since they demonstrate that subjective tests are
applied only when commercial standards are unavailable.
230 E.g., Wolff v. Smith, 303 Ill. App. 413, 25 N.E.2d 399 (1940); Bowen v. Buckner,
183 S.W. 704 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916).
"I1 See McKendrie v. Noel, 146 Colo. 440, 362 P.2d 880 (1961) (sale of automatic rug
cleaners).
132 See, e.g., Ard Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 202 F.2d 372 (5th Cir.
1953); Fursmidt v. Hotel Abbey Holding Corp., 10 App. Div. 2d 447, 200 N.Y.S.2d 256
(1960). Compare Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
268 N.Y. 108, 196 N.E. 760 (1935), with Schneider v. Vietor, 208 App. Div. 624, 203
N.Y. Supp. 897 (1924). See generally 3 WILLISrON § 675.
133 Even though the relationship between manufacturer and dealer is commercial,
one factor which may have caused dealers to rely on authorities suggesting a subjective
good faith standard was the fact that many franchise agreements contained satisfaction
clauses. See, e.g., E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224,
227 (8th Cir. 1933); Mills-Morris Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 7 F.2d 38, 39
(6th Cir. 1925); Tennessee & S.E. Coal Co. v. Schwitzer-Cummins Co., 173 Tenn. 524,
121 S.W.2d 553 (1938); Macaulay 565 & n.435 (before 1956 some automobile dealer
franchises required the dealer to sell to the manufacturer's satisfaction).
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The Good Faith Cases
The good faith argument has had only sporadic success when
applied to franchise or franchise-type agreements. The two cases
most often relied on as establishing the good faith principle were
both decided in 1931.
The first decision, J. R. Watkins Co. v. Rich,134 involved termina-
tion of a sales agent one month after execution of the contract. In an
action against the sales agent's sureties, the Supreme Court of
Michigan ruled that the unexplained termination by the manufac-
turer so soon after entering into the contract, which was terminable
at will without cause, demonstrated that the sureties' signatures had
been fraudulently secured. The manufacturer's only purpose in
executing the contract, according to the court, was to obtain the
sureties' guarantee and then collect immediately on the agent's debt,
most of which had been incurred under an earlier contract. The
holding in Rich, therefore, can be viewed as nothing more than a
reaffirmation of the well-established doctrine that "a contractual
promise made with the undisclosed intention of not performing it
is a fraud."'35
Had the Michigan court said no more it seems questionable
whether Rich would ever have been given any prominence. 36 But
the court preceded its conclusion by imposing what seemed to be
a constructive good faith condition on the power to terminate when
it commented:
A provision in a contract for termination at the option of a
party is valid. But where the relationship is commercial and does
not involve fancy, taste, sensibility, judgment, or other personal
features, the option may be exercised only in good faith. 3 7
This dictum seems wholly unreliable, however. The court applied
tests adopted in sales and service satisfaction cases (in reverse of their
usual application) even though the manufacturer relied on its power
131254 Mich. 82, 235 N.W. 845 (1931).
1 3 5 R-STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 473 (1932). Cf. id. §§ 475-76; Note, 38 COLUM. L.
Rxv. 1461 (1938).
(1932); Note, 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1461 (1938).
"" For a comparable holding involving similar facts and a suit by the dealer in tort
for fraud, see Patterson-Pope Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 66 Ga. App. 41, 16 S.E.2d
877 (1941). The Rich decision gained additional notoriety because it applied Michigan
law, which was also stipulated to be the law governing most automobile dealer
franchises-the most commonly litigated franchise agreement.
137 254 Mich. at 84-85, 235 N.W. at 846.
Vol. 1967: 465]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
to terminate at will. None of the authorities relied on by the
Michigan court supports a general good faith limitation; 13 in fact,
other Michigan decisions seem to contradict any application of a
constructive good faith term.139 Moreover, if a general limitation
were intended, the sales agent as well as the sureties should have
been relieved of liability.140
The second case, Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual
Tires Stores,'41 also seems difficult to accept. There the manufacturer
of Philco radios terminated one of its jobbers without giving advance
notice under an agreement which required only that the jobber be
advised of the termination in writing. Upon receipt of the termina-
tion letter the jobber stopped payment on a check mailed to the
manufacturer for materials received. In an action on the check,
Philco demurred to the jobber's answer and counterclaim which
asserted that- the jobber had made a substantial investment in the
business and that the termination was ineffective because it was part
of a conspiracy to replace the jobber and wreck his business. The
Supreme Court of South Carolina conceded that Philco had the
Is$ The court relied on the following authorities: Bishop v. Bloomington Canning
Co., 307 Ill. 179, 138 N.E. 597 (1923); Brown v. Board for Educ., 117 Kan. 256, 231 Pac.
72 (1924); Holton v. Monarch Motor Car Co., 202 Mich. 271, 168 N.W. 539 (1918);
Brucker v. Manistee & G.R. R.R., 166 Mich. 330, 130 N.W. 822 (1911); Commer v.
Butts, 40 Mich. 332 (1879); 13 C.J. Contracts § 632 (1917). None of these authorities
supports the imposition of a subjective good faith test where the relationship between
parties is commercial-and in Rich the court held that the relationship between the
manufacturer and sales agent was commercial. These authorities are also inapposite
since all involve satisfaction contracts or performance tests such as "good cause" or
"reasonable grounds" (which are measured by the same tests applied in the satisfac.
tion cases), whereas the agreement in Rich between the manufacturer and sales agent
as well as the suretyihip agreement was terminable at will. Moreover, the Michigan
court had long adopted the personal-commercial distinction generally applied in inter-
preting satisfaction contracts which would have required application of objective
criteria here. See, e.g., Wood Mach. Co. v. Smith, 50 Mich. 565, 15 N.W. 906 (1888).
239The Michigan court had previously held sales agency contracts without fixed
terms terminable at will without proof that the termination was made in good faith.
Garlock v. Motz Tire & Rubber Co., 192 Mich. 665, 159 N.W. 344 (1916); Fuchs v.
Standard Therometer Co., 178 Mich. 37, 144 N.W. 484 (1913); accord, Bushwick-
Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 116 F.2d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1940); Martin v.
Ford Motor Co., 93 F. Supp. 920, 921 (E.D. Mich. 1950).
140 Since the sales agent did not appeal from the trial court's judgment, the Michigan
Supreme Court was not actually faced with the question of his liability. On the other
hand, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment and quoted extensively from its
opinion; if a good faith limitation was intended, the trial court's judgment against the
sales agent seems erroneous. Thus, the trial court and supreme court judgments
and opinions are reconcilable only if viewed as a refusal to enforce a fraudulent
promise.
142 161 S.C. 487, 159 S.E. 825 (1931).
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right under the agreement to terminate the jobber at will. Never-
theless, it held that the answer and counterclaim set forth a defense
and claim because, if proved, the jobber's allegations showed (1)
that Philco had induced the jobber "to buy heavily of its merchan-
dise, for the payment of which it holds [the jobber, while] ... it now
relieves itself of the obligation to fulfill the warranties of its goods,
and the service to be furnished to the purchasers of them . ..";
and (2) that Philco's "intent and purpose" was "to wreck the busi-
ness of defendant." 142 Thus, Philadelphia Storage Battery holds no
more than that a franchisee (who has invested in the business) can
be terminated only after he has had a reasonable opportunity to
recoup his investment; a manufacturer does not relieve itself of
contractual warranty obligations by exercising the power to termi-
nate; and intentional injury of another's business may give rise to an
action in tort.
Once again, had the court gone no further it seems doubtful
whether this case would have achieved any significance. But the
court supported its decision by asserting that a "necessary corollary"
to the doctrine that an option to cancel will be enforced only if not
contrary to equity and good conscience 143 is the rule that an agree-
ment "may not be terminated, if the manner of its termination be
against equity and good conscience."' 144 In emphasizing the manner
of termination, the court obviously was referring not to Philco's
failure to give advance notice but rather to its bad motives, including
its over-reaching, which was to make it no stranger to the courts.
45
As noted earlier, neither Rich nor Philadelphia Storage Battery
has gained much acceptance. Both cases can be explained by other
rules of contract law, and, possibly, as examples of semi-covert
attempts to prevent gross misuse of economic power. A federal court
when faced with the South Carolina court's decision, followed it
reluctantly and observed that it was "different from the rule pre-
vailing in most American jurisdictions."'146 No Michigan court has
112 Id. at 492,'159 S.E. at 827.
14 See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
1, 161 S.C. at 490, 159 S.E. at 826.
See Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Kelley-How-Thomson Co., 64 F.2d 834
(8th Cir. 1933).
116 Gaines W. Harrison & Sons v. J. I. Case Co., 180 F. Supp. 243, 253 (E.D.S.C.
1960).
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interpreted Rich as requiring a constructive good faith condition on
termination rights; only isolated cases have accepted it.147
Probably the single most important event in the general rejection
of a good faith condition was the Second Circuit's decision in
Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 48 There the issue
of good faith was clear-cut. A terminated automobile dealer alleged
that Ford's termination of him was "malicious, in bad faith, and
contrary to the custom of the trade, and therefore wrongful"; 4 9 the
manufacturer responded that the dealer's allegations were of no con-
sequence, because it had an "unqualified power to terminate, irre-
spective of its reasons for doing so."150 Applying Michigan law, as
required by the franchise agreement, the court held that it did not
require imposition of a good faith limitation. Rich, the court said,
applied good faith only as a test of the manufacturer's original in-
tention to offer the dealer a fair opportunity to perform and recoup
his original debts and investment.' 51
However, the Second Circuit went on to examine whether a good
faith test should be applied. Adhering closely to classic rules of free-
dom of contract theory, it reasoned that when the contract specifically
provides for termination at will, the parties can hardly be viewed as
2'4 The two courts which have so applied Rich have had to reverse themselves later.
In Busam Motor Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F. Supp. 790, 796 (S.D. Ohio 1949),
appeal dismissed, 185 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1950), Judge Druffel cited Rich as authority
for the proposition that under Michigan law an option to terminate at will must be
exercised in good faith; hence he granted defendant's motion for a new trial since
the evidence did not sustain the jury verdict based on a finding that the manufacturer
had not acted in good faith. Following the retrial, however, the case came before
the court a second time and this time Chief Judge Nevin held that the "right to
terminate was not subject to question on grounds of unreasonableness, unfairness, lack
of good faith, bad faith or because of motive, intent or resultant detriment to plain-
tiff." 104 F. Supp. 639, 643 (S.D. Ohio 1952), rev'd on other grounds, 203 F.2d 469
(6th Cir. 1953). A similar change of view is reflected between the court's first opinion
in Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, 51 Del. 264, 284-85, 144 A.2d 123, 134 (1958), and its
ruling on denial of defendant's petition for a rehearing in 51 Del. 295, 297, 144 A.2d
885, 886-87 (1958).
I's 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940) (Clark, J.), affirming 30 F. Supp. 917 (E.D.N.Y.
1940). Despite their general lack of success, terminated dealers have continued to
argue that the court should impose a constructive good faith condition on the power to
terminate. E.g., Zaiden v. Borg-Warner Corp., 228 F. Supp. 669, 670 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
aff'd, 341 F.2d 391 (3d Cir. 1965); Smoky Mountains Beverage Co. v. Anheuser-
Busch, Inc., 182 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Tenn. 1960); Sharpe v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 9
F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); see Rubinger v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 193 F.
Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 310 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1962).
119 116 F.2d at 676.
250 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
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having intended to insert a good faith limitation. This proposition
seems indisputable. More questionable is the court's analysis of why
good faith conditions should not be imposed as a matter of public
policy. The court argued as follows:
Such a limitation can be read into the agreement only as an over-
riding requirement of public policy. This seems an extreme step
for judges to take .... [T]he dealers are not misled or imposed
upon, but accept as nonetheless advantageous an agreement in
form bilateral, in fact one-sided. To attempt to redress this
balance by judicial action without legislative authority appears
to us a doubtful policy. We have not proper facilities to weigh
economic factors, nor have we before us a showing of the supposed
needs which may lead the manufacturers to require these seemingly
harsh bargains.152
Whatever the validity of this analysis in 1940, the rationale seems
questionable today. Enforcement of minimum standards of fairness
is not such an innovative step that it can be taken only as an over-
riding matter of public policy or after legislative mandate. Economic
duress, for example, has long been recognized as a basis of preventing
unjust enrichment; it "treats the reasonableness of contract terms as
a matter of concern for the courts."'153 Courts, in addition, are
constantly called upon to weigh economic factors and to determine
economic needs-tasks imposed by statute and assumed under com-
mon law practice. 154 Finally, reliance solely on legislative direction
for establishment of tests of valid exercises of termination powers
likewise seems neither realistic nor desirable; the problem of develop-
152 Id. at 677. (Emphasis added.) Compare Judge Clark's views on freedom of
contract one year later in Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147, 149 (2d
Cir. 1941) quoted at note 40 supra.
'
3 Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure: 11, 20 N.C.L. REv. 341, 361 (1942). See
Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MIcH. L. REv. 253, 288-89
(1947): "[T]he modem American law of duress reflects the convergence of several lines
of growth .... This conflict and confusion must be attributed in part to the fact
that the processes of growth are still continuing and the effects of earlier history are
not yet dissipated. In part, however, they are due to the complex issues of ethics and
economic policy that constantly intrude themselves and on which courts, like other
agencies of organized society, must take a positive stand.
"... Above all, where judicial review is refused the decision should not depend
on a formula inherited from the thirteenth century but on a conscious evaluation
of the factors that make judicial review impracticable or unwise." But see Hale,
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLum. L. Rav. 603, 625 (1943).
2 The antitrust laws and their common law antecedents are the most obvious
example. Sherman Act, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1964);
see United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
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ing minimum fairness standards is particularly appropriate for case-
by-case adjudication.155
Even if the development of such standards can be viewed as
consistent with freedom of contract theory it does not automatically
follow that good faith limitations which concentrate on the termi-
nating party's motives are either appropriate or desirable. The
justification generally asserted for the imposition of a good faith
condition as a matter of policy is that it is necessary to mitigate the
effects of a harsh bargain or to prevent an improper windfall.1 60
Both considerations were apparently present, for example, in Phila-
delphia Storage Battery. While there can be little controversy that
some protection is desirable to insure that elemental fairness is
observed, in no case has the question been asked: Would the im-
position of a good faith test be effective in protecting the terminated
party against over-reaching or in preventing unjust enrichment?
. Analytically, the terminating party's motives are unrelated to
the harshness of the bargain or of its effect. Motives have no relation-
ship to the parties' relative bargaining power. Nor would the appli-
cation of a good faith test be affected either by whether the dominant
party was misusing its power or by whether termination would have
unduly harsh effects on the terminated party. Rather, its applica-
tion would be determined by the extent to which such misuse was
disclosed by improper motives. The assumption, in other words,
seems to be that fairness can be assured (or fundamental unfairness
prevented) by attention to the motives upon which a party acts. Not
only is empirical support for this assumption lacking, but .it also
seems contrary to common sense. There is no evidence that a weaker
party .would be protected adequately by requiring the dominant
party to exhibit proper motives in exercising the power to termi-
-5 "[Legislation] has a serious disadvantage. It does away with the flexibility with.
out which only very few trades can do. It enlarges the businessman's risk and does not
allow him to take measures against its increase, measures which only he can devise
and which must be applied rapidly. Legislative compulsion works best where a trade
has grown into a quasi-governmental function, as, e.g., insurance or traffic; it is
almost impossible in all other branches." PRAusNrrz, THE STANDAmZATON OF COM-
MERIxAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAw 145 (1937); see Llewellyn, Book
Review, 52 HARv. L. REV. 700, 705 (1939); 52 COLum. L. REV. 669 (1952). Compare
Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN.
L Rzv. 265 (1963).
1'45 HARv. L. Rv. 378 (1931); cf. 17 CORNELL L.Q. 479 (1932). See also Note,
31 COLUM. L. Rxv. 830, 840-42 (1931).
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nate.157 For example, would a termination for the sole purpose of
furthering the economic self-interest of the terminating party be evi-
dence of lack of good faith? Probably not. But it cannot be seri-
ously questioned that such a termination may nevertheless have
substantial unfair effects on the terminated party's business. Con-
versely, bad faith motives may not result in any unfairness to the
terminated party. On the other hand, the case against good faith
conditions is easily overstated. At least in the cases in which it has
been applied, there is little question that but for the good faith
limitation the terminations would have caused the terminated parties
to suffer substantial losses.
Aside from consideration of the effectiveness of a good faith test,
it is also questionable whether, as a matter of policy, subjective terms
should be imported into contracts unless absolutely necessary. In-
terpretation of certain satisfaction contracts may present no alterna-
tive, especially if the parties have clearly expressed their intention
that a subjective test is to be applied. But legal tests involving
subjective motivation generally have created troublesome problems,
particularly in the law of contracts.158 Thus, unless fundamental
fairness cannot be assured the terminated party by other means, a
subjective good faith condition dependent upon the terminating
party's motives has little to recommend it.
V
THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILriY AS AN ALTERNATIVE-
A RECOMMENDATION
From this survey it seems fair to conclude that if assuring fair-
ness is a proper objective, and both direct and indirect limitations
are applied on the premise that it is, then the dealer is not protected
adequately against termination abuse. The defects of the indirect
257 See Macaulay 509.
25See 3A COBIN § 644, at 82; Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer
Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 So. CAL. L. REv. 48 (1966); Note, 23
N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 143 (1948). Compare Ames, How Far An Act May Be A Tort Because
of The Wrongful Motive of The Actor, 18 H-Iv. L. Ra,. 411 (1905); Duport, Dis-
interested Malevolence as an Actionable Wrong, 22 FoRDHAM L. Rv. 185 (1953);
Comment, The Employers "Good Faith" Bargaining Duty-A Troublesome Test in
the Taft-Hartley Act, 17 W. Ras. L. REv. 1390 (1966). Thus, where it is doubtful
whether words mean personal (i.e., subjective) satisfaction or reasonable (i.e., objec-
tive) satisfaction, the latter standard is usually applied. See RESTATEMESNT, CONTArs
§ 265 (1932).
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techniques of construction are obvious. They are seldom relied upon
in the termination situation; and even when they are, the effect is
not always desirable. Reliance on semi-covert methods distorts rules
of construction and the distortions carry over to other contexts.
Moreover, application of rules of construction depends not on the
level of unfairness but on the craftsmanship of those drafting the
termination clause-and there is no necessary correlation between
the two.
Some direct restraints on termination abuse, however, have simi-
lar shortcomings. Except for barriers to discriminatory and fraudu-
lent terminations, a dealer's protection against unfair or unneces-
sarily harsh terminations may be easily evaded or be available only
against the worst abuses. Express agreement can avoid the Missouri
doctrine; tort recovery in a termination context protects against
little more than outright fraud; economic duress is an obscure doc-
trine which has traditionally afforded only restitutionary relief; and
unconscionability has been used only hesitatingly and against oc-
casional gross unfairness.
With the traditional channels of judicial relief seemingly closed
and with the courts unwilling to alleviate the dealers' complaints,
the problem would seem to require legislative solution. Llewellyn,
however, in a related context, has counseled that "an approach by
statute seems to me dubious, uncertain, and likely to be both awk-
ward in manner or deficient and spotty in scope."-T9 Other thought-
ful commentators have agreed.160 Furthermore, legislation at this
stage seems unlikely. As a practical matter the dealers are too
diffuse a group to exert sufficient political pressure. There are
hundreds of companies distributing their products through dealers
in scores of fields, including such diverse operations as cemetery
stone sales, dance studios, tax and accounting recordkeeping services,
and theft prevention. 161 The manufacturers, by contrast, would
probably be able to organize effectively since many, if not most,
might view any "tampering" with termination rights as destructive
of their businesses. Even such a highly organized, politically power-
ful, and homogeneous group as the automobile dealers had to
expend years of effort and considerable sums of money to obtain
1
'9 LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALs 370 (1960).
10 See note 155 supra.
261 See KURSH, THE FRANCHISE BOOM Appendix B at 207-46 (1962).
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generally unsatisfactory federal and often ineffective state legisla-
tion. 62  This very diversity might also prevent specific legislation
from being successful. The requirements of minimum fairness,
rather, need to be worked out under the demands of practical
application. Thus the problem of developing minimum standards
of fairness for termination of a dealer is peculiarly suited to case-by-
case adjudication. Nonetheless, legislation would seem appropriate
and desirable if it were to incorporate flexible standards and provide
an equitable framework for dealer protection.163 Such standards
are suggested below and the virtue of their codification would be
the prod which they might then provide for reticent courts currently
mired in antiquated and inapplicable rules of contract law.
On the other hand, the problem does not necessarily require
radical revision of present doctrines. 64 Viewed from the angle
102 The long struggle on the part of automobile dealers is recounted in Macaulay
512-54. As to the success of their struggle, compare Macaulay 817-40, with Freed, A
Study of Dealers' Suits Under the Automobile Dealers' Franchise Act, 41 U. DET.
LJ. 245, 256-61 (1964), and Comment, 74 YALE L.J. 354, 356 (1964).
183See notes 178-80 infra and accompanying text. The issue is presently before
Congress. A "good faith" bill modeled after the Automobile Dealers' Day-in-Court
Act and applicable to all franchise agreements has been introduced into the House.
H.R. 2818, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The staff of the Senate Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly is also drafting a bill to guard against arbitrary c.ncellation of
franchises. Letter From Senator Philip A. Hart to the author, February 9, 1967.
Puerto Rico, on the other hand, has already adopted the legislative approach in the
Dealer's Act of 1964, which provides that a dealer has a tort action against a manu-
facturer who terminates, refuses to renew, or impairs an existing franchise relationship
without "just cause." The statutory test of just cause applies "[n]otwithstanding the
existence in a dealer's contract of a clause reserving to the parties the unilateral right
to terminate the existing relationship" or of a clause automatically ending the rela-
tionship after a specific time period. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 10, § 278 (1964), as amended,
P.R. Acts 1966, No. 105. By rigidly proscribing all terminations except for judicially
determined "just cause," this legislation can be condemned as incorporating all the
defects inveighed by Llewellyn and Prausnitz. For example, a manufacturer seemingly
cannot effectively limit the franchise grant to a specific term; except for cause it runs
in perpetuity. Arguably, the manufacturer cannot even appoint an additional dealer
in an existing dealer's sales territory. See United Medical Equip. Corp. v. S. Blickman,
Inc., 260 F. Supp. 912 (D.P.R. 1966).
26 It has been suggested that in the adhesion contract situation the English doc-
trine of "fundamental breach" should be adopted. Simply stated, this doctrine would
deny judicial enforcement of warranty disciaimers and other exculpatory contract
clauses when such enforcement is inconsistent with the primary purposes and obliga-
tions of the contract. Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Funda-
mental Breach, 50 VA. L. RFv. 1178 (1964). See also Devlin, The Treatment of
Breach of Contract, 1966 CAMa. L.J. 192. Adoption of this approach in the termina-
tion context, however, would not appear to provide any useful guideline as to when
a power to terminate should be enforceable; substantial breach is at least the equivalent
of "just cause."
On the other hand, the civil law has long recognized the notion of good faith in
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of potential rather than actual relief, the doctrine of unconscion-
ability would seem ideally suited as a vehicle for establishing mini-
mum requirements of fairness. The doctrine cannot be eluded by
express agreement. It was created originally for the purpose of avoid-
ing unscrupulous bargains; its utilization as a means of imposing
minimum standards of fairness would be a substantial but con-
sistent extension. In addition, the doctrine has been undergoing
significant change in recent years as a result of agitation for its appli-
cation to inconsistent standardized contract terms which were not
negotiated and because of its inclusion in the Uniform Commercial
Code. But since the inertia of freedom of contract theory is sub-
stantial, the tentative suggestions made here deliberately involve
no new departures; each is borrowed from an existing contract doc-
trine. 65 Finally, the lessons implicit in the ineffectiveness of the
indirect and direct limitations on termination abuse should not be
the enforcement of contract rights under the title of "abuse of rights." Without at-
tempting to detail its many applications, it is sufficient to note that the abuse of rights
approach has been plagued by confusion over whether objective or subjective tests of
good faith should be applied. Rosenberg, The Notion of Good Faith in the Civil Law
of Quebec, 7 McGxim L.J. 2, 19-23 (1960); Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rav. 401, 415-18 (1961).
See generally Angus, Abuse of Rights in Contractual Matters in the Province ofQuebec, 8 McGim L.J. 150 (1962). See also Gutteridge, Abuse of Rights, 5 CAMN. LJ.
22 (1933); Powell, Good Faith in Contracts, 9 CURRENT LEGAL PROaLEMS 16 (1956).
The result has often been unsatisfactory uncertainty in the application of the doctrine
and only limited protection for the dealer since many of the protections can be
evaded by careful drafting of the franchise agreement. See Hannon, Cancellation of
Distributorship and Sales Agency Agreements in Europe: The French Example, 41 LA.
BAR BuLL. 222 (1966).
x85Although the proposal made here is evolutionary rather than revolutionary, it
does not avoid the "defect" asserted by some commentators against the adoption of
§2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code-that too much power is given the courts
to alter private agreements and that this poses a threat to commercial stability.
See, e.g., King, Suggested Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 33 ORE. L.
REv. 113, 115-16 (1954); California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code,
The Uniform Commercial Code, 37 CALF. ST. B.J. 119, 135-36 (1962) (recommendation
not to adopt § 2-302). But see Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 LAw
& CONT MP. PROB. 3, 19 n.78 (1951). Being unwilling to sacrifice minimum standards of
elemental fairness to the desire for stability, the approach recommended here sides
with the draftsmen of the Code. However, the suggestion of specific measures of fair-
ness is intended to minimize any unstabling effects.
It should be noted that the concern here is with fairness of the franchise agree-
ment's terms and effects (which have been labelled "substantive" unconscionability)
rather than with the process of contracting (which has been denominated "procedural"
unconscionability). See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967). A finding of the latter is arguably a pre-
requisite to holding of unconscionability under § 2-302 of the code. Id. at 489-508.
But; as noted below (see note 178 infra), franchise agreements are seldom negotiated
and hence, the serious questions concern "substantive" unconscionability.
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ignored. If the protection afforded by a new doctrine of unconsion-
ability is to be effective in guaranteeing fairness, judicial scrutiny of
termination abuse must focus on three areas: (1) the terms of the
agreement; (2) the effects of the termination; and (3) the relief
ordered. These facets of the problem are considered seriatim.
The Terms
It seems indisputable that the ancient madman test as well as
the measure of gross unfairness is too narrow a definition of un-
conscionability to protect a dealer against unfair termination. Both
reflect the business standards of the past rather than the present. As
a result, changes have often been called for in the scope and meaning
of the doctrine. Llewellyn, for example, suggested that in testing
the fairness of standard form contracts, courts should view the agree-
ment as two contracts; the agreement on the negotiated terms and
the supplementary boilerplate.16 6 He contended that the latter
"agreement" should be enforced only if it is reasonable and con-
sistent with the negotiated terms. But in the termination context
this approach may work against the party whom the rule is designed
to protect. For example, if the termination provision is unenforce-
able because it was not negotiated and is inconsistent with the
negotiated terms, a termination power is implied-and ii the fran-
chise situation this normally means that either party may terminate
at will (subject only to the limitations of the Missouri doctrine, if
followed). Thus, if the dealer has recently made a new investment
but the franchise has been in effect for some time, the dealer is at
the mercy of the manufacturer, who can terminate the relationship
at any time as long as adequate notice is given the dealer.
The most significant change in the doctrine of unconscionability
probably has been effected by the recent departure of the framers
of the Uniform Commercial Code, who specifically incorporated
the doctrine into modem sales law for the first time. The actual
terms of section 2-302,167 however, are disappointing to one seeking
260 LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMION-DEmDING APPEALs 370-71 (1960).
S67, (1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause
as to avoid any unconsionable result. (2) When it is claimed or appears to the court
that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
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the advancement of minimum standards. No attempt was made
to define unconscionability. The framers disclaimed any intention
of seeking to disturb risk allocation because of superior bargaining
power. The section was supposedly designed only to prevent "op-
pression and unfair surprise."1 8 Nonetheless, by specifically setting
out the doctrine as a basis for relief, attention is called to its
availability. Moreover, procedures are spelled out for the proof
of unconscionability. A terminated party to a sales contract, for
example, now has a "right" to attack the unreasonableness of the
terms by submission of proof of their "commercial setting, purpose
and effect."
More importantly, the impact of the doctrine in sales situations
is beginning to be felt.16 9 In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co., 70 a court recently adopted the Code's approach to uncon-
scionability in considering the enforceability of a furniture store's
"add-on" or consolidated installment sales contract, even though
the Code was not in effect in the jurisdiction at the time the contract
was signed. While the court remanded the case for taking of evi-
dence of possible unconscionability, it did establish that in finding
the doctrine applicable two elements should be considered: (1) was
there "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties"; and (2) were the "contract terms . . .unreasonably favor-
able to the other party."' 71  Lack of meaningful choice-which is
arguably nothing more than another phrasing 6f Llewellyn's sug-
gestion of negotiated terms-includes those situations where one
party either has no choice as to the inclusion of a particular term
or is unaware of its presence or effect. Obviously the relative bar-
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination." UCC § 2-302. See
generally Leff, supra note 165, at 485 (1967) (critically examining the drafters' failure
to spell out relevant factors which a court should consider in determining uncon-
scionability).
268 UCC § 2-302, comment 1.
-
9 Courts have historically applied the polities of the uniform acts beyond the
subject-matter of the act where reason and policy require. UCC § 1-102, comment
(cases collected); see Leff, supra note 165, at 486 n.4 (collecting authorities). But see In
re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 873 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
17o 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Not surprisingly, defendant's sales contract was
apparently no stranger to the courts. See IV. T. Walker Furniture Co. v. Dyson, 32
App. D.C. Cir. 1908). See also American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105
N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
27350 F.2d at 449.
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gaining power of the parties will be significant here. And where
such choice was absent, the court held that the reasonableness of
the terms was to be determined by reliance on Corbin's test of
whether the terms were unacceptable according to "the mores and
business practices of the time. 172
Application of the test laid down in Williams, however, would
not necessarily provide sufficient protection for a terminated dealer.
First, the test seems internally inconsistent. If the dealer is offered
a choice of terms by the manufacturer or other manufacturers, the
Williams rule would not protect him even if the terms were grossly
unfair, because the dealer was free to select another manufacturer.
But if the dealer has no choice, the prevalent business practice set-
ting the standard of minimum fairness might be the very uniform
terms to which the dealer is objecting. Second, even if a broader
commercial setting is considered in ascertaining the business mores
against which the contract is measured, such a test seems little more
than judicial approval of the lowest common denominator of busi-
ness practices without regard to the parties' relative needs or the
fairness of the contract terms. Questionable terms, established as
business mores because of competitive requirements, might thus
become judicial tests of fairness. Nor is it uncommon.for whole
industries to persuade themselves that matters of convenience are
an economic necessity. 73
This criticism of the negotiated terms or business mores approach
espoused by Llewellyn, Corbin, and the Williams court does not go
to the purpose or essence of these proposals. Rather it is concerned
with the probable ineffectiveness of such tests in applying sanctions
against unfair terminations of a dealer. If applicable, however, they
should not be ignored.
On the other hand, the suggestion that contract termination
provisions meet minimum standards of fairness is not wholly without
precedent in the law of contracts. In enforcing liquidated damage
provisions, courts follow the rule that such a term is enforceable
(and the amount collectible) only if, at the time the contract
was entered into, the damages arising from breach were difficult
to ascertain and the stipulated amount bore a reasonable relation-
172 Id. at 450; accord, Mandel -. Liebman, 503 N.Y. 88, 93-94, 100 N.E.2d 149, 152-
53 (1951); 1 CORBIN § 128.
'7 See, e.g., Macaulay 547.
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ship to the anticipated loss. 74  Even though the liquidated dam-
ages test is usually stated in terms of the intention of the parties-
did they make a bona fide attempt to estimate the damages or was
the stipulated figure adopted for its in terrorem effect' 7 5-courts
have ignored form and concentrated on the proportionality of the
amount stipulated to the losses which could be reasonably ex-
pected. 76
A similar test would seem feasible in measuring the fairness of
contract termination provisions where the negotiated-terms, business-
mores tests prove inadequate.177 In other words, where it appears
that the termination conditions seem unfair even though they meet
the business practices of the industry and were negotiated, their fair-
ness could be tested by requiring that the condition which "creates"
the right to terminate the agreement in one Party must bear a reason-
able relationship to the risks sought to be allocated and the benefits
granted by the agreement.78  This proposed test necessarily in-
cludes the requirement of the Missouri doctrine in connection with
117, Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d 10
,(1953); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 339 (1932).
175 Cf. Atkinson v. Pacific Fire Extinguisher Co., 40 Cal. 2d 192, 253 P.2d 18 (1953);
H. J. McGrath Co. v. Wisner, 189 Md. 260, 55 A.2d 793 (1947); Anderson v. Cactus
Heights Country Club, 80 S.D. 417, 125 N.W.2d 491 (1963); 5 CoRaaN §§ 1058, 1059.
176 5 id. §§ 1057-60. See generally Fritz, "Underliquidated" Damages as Limitation
of Liability, 33 TExs L. REv. 196 (1954). Again, judicial efforts to avoid unfair results
have created a gap between freedom of contract rhetoric and reality. Comment, 72 YALE
L.J. 723, 746 (1963).
ITT In fact, the line between a valid termination and an unenforceable forfeiture is
often difficult to draw. Compare Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agri-
culture; 141 Colo. 467, 348 P.2d 962 (1960), with Kahn v. Janowski, 191 Md. 279, 60
A.2d 519 (1948). See Jones v. Chester, 363 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
278Just as liberal applications of the doctrine of unconscionability have occurred
most frequently where the bargaining position of the parties was substantially out of
balance, in applying this proposed test courts should question whether the risk and
benefit imbalance really exists when the parties appear to have similar economic
strength. Relative bargaining power or negotiated terms probably is not a serious
question in most franchise termination situations since, except in infant industries, it
is invariably the franchisor who drafts all contract terms and who holds the power
which can be used in this situation. See generally Hearings 11 at 497-98, 696-99 (state-
ment of Senator Hart); KURSH, THE FRANCHiSE BOOM (1962). In most cases, for ex-
ample, the franchisor is well established in the business.
A test comparable to that suggested here was adopted by the court in a bankruptcy
proceeding: "[T]o prove unconscionability there must be a showing, not only that the
terms of the contract are onerous, oppressive, or one-sided, but also that the terms bear
no reasonable relation to the business risks. This is a showing that depends on the
commercial environment and cannot be made from the fact of a contract alone." In re
Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 873 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See also Consumers Time
Credit, Inc. v. Remark Corp., 259 F. Supp. 135, 137-38 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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advance notice and minimum duration, for the time at which a
termination power can be exercised is intimately connected with risk
allocation. 179 However, under this proposal, the terminating party
would not be denied enforcement merely because he cannot prove
an exact balance of risks and benefits; rather it would be the burden
of the party seeking to avoid termination to show that the imbalance
is unreasonably disproportionate.180
Such a test seems desirable and workable for several reasons.
First, a similar test has worked satisfactorily in connection with
liquidated damages. Although the problem of whether liquidated
damages should be enforced is not identical with the question of
whether a franchise termination condition is unconscionable, both
do involve the issue of fairness. Second, the proposed test concen-
trates on those elements of a termination condition which relate
directly to fairness. That is to say, a condition is obviously unfair
if all the risks are borne by one party while the benefits go to the
other. For example, a termination condition in a franchise to sell
heavy road machinery (where purchase commitments must be made
long in advance) may be unfair unless the terminated dealer is paid
the profits he would have earned on such sales had he continued to
be the dealer less the cost of fulfilling the dealer's service obligations
which would have reduced the dealer's profits on the sales. Thus by
requiring the risk allocation of the termination condition to be
proportional or to bear some reasonable relationship to the benefits
received, this tentative test seeks to rely on the constituent elements
of the concept of fairness. Third, this proposed test makes no attempt
to do more than provide a framework for measuring fairness. While
case applications of this proposed addition to the unconscionability
doctrine must remain the acid and necessary test, a few illustrations
will demonstrate its flexibility.
179 Application of the Missouri doctrine in the context of this proposed test should
also extend to new investments made after the contract relationship had been entered
into.
280 A similar solution was adopted by the framers of the code in defining "good
faith" tenders of output or requirement demand when an output or requirement con-
tract does not expressly impose specific limits. In order to impose a more specific limit
than that comprehended by the concept "good faith," § 2-306 (1) of the UCO specifies
"that no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the
absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output or
requirements may be tendered or demanded." (Emphasis added.) See Note, 78 HARV.
L. R v. 1212, 1217 (1965). See also HML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77,
81 (3d Cir. 1966).
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Franchisers often seek to minimize their risk by charging a speci-
fied period fee for use of a trade-name, know-how, etc. This assures
the franchisor a certain income. Barring other factors, a termination
condition in such a fixed-fee franchise agreement which is based
solely on the sales volume or other indicia of the franchisee's business
activity would seem unwarranted since the dealer, not the franchisor,
bore the risks of substandard sales. Similarly, a termination condi-
tion in a franchise agreement relating to a new product or service
should be unenforceable if based solely on sales performance where
the dealer bears all risks of introducing the new product on the
market (such as advertising, maintenance, and warranty), unless the
manufacturer can show that the risks it assumed were roughly com-
mensurate with those accepted by the dealer.
Or, to consider a widely used provision, automobile dealer fran-
chise agreements commonly provide that a dealer must sell a quota
of cars equal to the average number of cars sold by dealers of the
same make of car in his region who are similarly situated.181 If the
dealer fails to meet this quota, the manufacturer can terminate him
on ninety-days notice. 8 2 Several courts have specifically found this
condition "fair and reasonable."' 8 3 This would also probably be the
result under the two-element test applied in Williams. The termina-
tion conditions were not the result of negotiation between the parties
(and the.dealer had no meaningful choice other than not to enter
the business), but rather reflect the standardized terms imposed by
the manufacturer; nevertheless, the terms do reflect a common,
acceptable practice in the automobile and other franchise industries
and hence would probably be held reasonable. But this finding
seems questionable under the proposed risk-allocation, benefits-
conferred test. It gives the manufacturer the power (assuming a
normal frequency distribution'8 4) to terminate one-half of the dealer
force at any time. But do the benefits conferred on the dealer by the
181 E.g., Victory Motors of Savannah, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 357 F.2d 429,
430-31 (5th Cir. 1966).
182 E.g., Sam Goldfarb Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrsyler Corp., 214 F. Supp. 600, 601 (E.D.
Mich. 1962).
188 See cases cited note 110 supra.
1824 When the frequency distribution is normal, one-half of the dealers will perform
above the mean and one-half below. JOHNSON & JOHNSON, INTRODUcTION TO STATISTICAL
METHODS 182-92 (1953). The latter group of dealers would be terminable on ninety-
days notice under these contracts.
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franchise or the risks borne by the manufacturer justify such a con-
dition? Unless the manufacturer can show that the dealer's rate of
return on his investment is substantially in excess of other industries,
that the dealer's risks of loss are relatively low and the manufacturer's
high, or that competitive conditions are so onerous that the manu-
facturer may be forced out of business unless it retains this right,
the condition seems unconscionable.8 s That is, unless the benefits
granted by the agreement so favor the dealer that a balance 'is main-
tained only if the manufacturer has the power to dismiss half its
dealer force at any time, the condition should not be enforced. On
the other hand, a condition providing for termination if a dealer's
performance is substantially below the average dealer's performance
in his region-for example, if the dealer's sales are twenty-five per
cent below a reasonable quota-would seem to meet the test. The
manufacturer then would bear the risk of a regional or nationwide
decline in sales whereas the dealer would bear the risk of a sig-
nificant individual lapse. This tentative test, in other words, has
the elements of a workable measure of fairness. However, it will be
acceptable to manufacturer and dealer alike only if limited to dis-
proportionate allocations of risk or benefits. In addition, even if a
termination condition is held unenforceable, the court should not
hesitate to exercise its broad remedial powers and authorize termina-
tion on reasonable terms. And, of course, each party should still be
free to terminate for what is usually termed "just cause"-that is, for
noncompliance with reasonable terms of the agreement.
Finally, one might inquire why the fairness of termination terms
need be considered if the effects of the termination will also be tested.
This question, however, ignores the substantial coercive effects of
contract provisions even though legal sanctions have not been in-
285 In Madsen v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1966), the court relied
upon a similar analysis as a ground for finding such a termination provision "arbitrary,
coercive and unfair" and therefore in violation of the Dealers' Day-in-Court Act. The
evidence had shown that "some 40o of all Chrysler dealers fail to achieve the sales
figure imposed by the MSR [quota] formula and thus, [these dealers] are theoretically
subject to immediate termination." Id. at 492. On the other l and, the court also
emphasized the manufacturer's failure to adjust the quota formula because of local
conditions as the franchise agreement required. Perhaps because of the statutory
requirements, the court did not evaluate (nor apparently hear evidence from the
manufacturer on) the terminating party's economic needs which necessitated inclusion
of this termination condition. Compare Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen,
360 F.2d 437, 442 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966).
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voked. 8 6 Moreover, whether or not actual unfairness results, the
legal system should not assist a franchisor's or franchisee's attempt
to take advantage of basically unfair terms.
The Effects
Another difficulty then, somewhat unrelated to specific standards
of fairness, is the usual restriction of the unconscionability doctrine
to situations where the terms are too harsh at the time the parties
entered into the contract. The Llewellyn suggestion that terms
which have not been negotiated should be subjected to a special test
of consistency and reasonableness, in addition, does not avoid un-
necessarily harsh or unfair results. If fairness is the concern, the
effect, actual as well as expected, of non-negotiated terms on the
parties should also be a measure of their enforceability. Disregard-
ing inequalities in negotiating ability, later events not foreseen may
also cause negotiated provisions to operate unfairly.18 7  Nor is it
any answer to contend, as a freedom of contract theory exponent
might, that where the parties have freely allocated the risks, the
terminated party should "live with the bargain he has made" and not
be the beneficiary of special judicial relief. Such medieval notions
of justice or fairness are no longer justifiable, even if the enterprisers
have equal bargaining power and ability. At least some considera-
tion ought to be given to the relative burdens imposed on each of the
parties by enforcing or refusing to enforce the termination provision
at that time.
The framers of the Uniform Commercial Code gave limited
recognition to this concern when they expanded the doctrine of
unconscionability in section 2-302 by specifying that the fairness of
the terms was to be determined, inter alia, by consideration of their
"effect."'188  Undoubtedly, this concern reflects the views of most
contracting parties who are necessarily more concerned with the
286 See Macaulay 560-62; Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. REv. 55 (1963); Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of
Contracts in the Manufacturing Industry, Prac. Law., Nov. 1963, p. 13.
287 Where the subsequent events are foreseeable, however, it is more questionable
whether effects should be considered; rather fairness should be measured under the
risk allocation test applied to the contract terms.
188 See note 167 supra. But § 2-302 is applicable only if the contract clause is
offensive "at the time it was made": hence the evidence of effect is seemingly determined
without the aid of hindsight. Cf. Better Food Mkts., Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co.,
40 Cal. 2d 179, 185, 253 P.2d 10, 14 (1953).
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actual rather than the potential effect of the termination provisions.
Courts would probably agree. One reason the doctrine of un-
conscionability may not have been applied liberally in the past is
that the losses to the terminated party often have not seemed severe,
especially when compared to the potential losses to the manufacturer
if the termination provision were not enforced. Courts, in other
words, are naturally reluctant to refuse enforcement of terms which,
though harsh on their face, have not been applied oppressively. 8 9
Conversely, it seems anomalous to hold the doctrine inapplicable,
even though the effect of termination is oppressive, only because the
termination clause is not unreasonable in light of the facts known
at the time of execution. 190
There is, in addition, solid precedent for testing fairness at the
time of termination. As noted already, limitations of reasonableness
relating to the minimum period of duration and to advance notice
time before termination are now being applied in light of the actual
effects of termination. Again, the rules relating to liquidated dam-
ages are instructive. As Corbin observed,
Frequently the amount of the payment or of the forfeiture is in
excess of the loss actually suffered by reason of the breach of con-
tract. When such is the case the courts are disinclined to. enforce
the provision. It has seemed to them that, in case of breach of
contract, justice requires nothing more than compensation mea-
sured by the amount of the harm suffered. Penalties and for-
feitures are not so measured. Therefore, the courts have created
a limitation upon freedom of contract .... 19
The liquidated damages provision in the Uniform Commercial Code
likewise measures the "reasonableness" of a liquidated damages
agreement by reference, in part, to the "anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach.'1 92
Adapted to the termination situation, the test of unconscion-
ability at the time of termination might be whether the harm which
will or is likely to result to the terminatedt party from enforcing the
termination provision is proportional to the harm which will or is
11 Despite their broad contract powers to cancel dealers and the number of dealers
in "technical default," automobile manufacturers, for example, have terminated only
a small fraction of their dealer force. See Macaulay 504 n.67.
190 Compare notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
'9'5 CORN § 1057, at 333-34.
--- UCC § 2-718 (1).
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likely to result to the terminating party if the provision is not en-
forced. Again, equivalence of harm is not the test; only dispro-
portionate harm is censured. This test would be applied in light of
the facts known at the time of actual or proposed termination. 10 3
And the "harm" referred to in the test is that detriment which proxi-
mately follows from enforcement of the termination condition (or
refusal to enforce the condition).94 For example, if the termina-
tion would force a dealer out of business, the losses he is likely to
suffer can be calculated with reasonable accuracy (for example, lost
profits less return on capital salvaged from the business and invested
elsewhere). Under the proposed test this harm would then be com-
pared to that harm which the manufacturer is likely to sustain if the
dealer is continued (for example, lost profits-that is, the profits which
the franchisor could be expected to earn on larger volume sales to
the replacement dealer-plus the indirect costs of retaining sub-
standard dealers). If the costs of termination to the dealer are dis-
proportionate, the termination condition would not be enforceable.
Fairness, however, would probably also compel the court not to
refuse enforcement, but only to modify the termination condition
so that the dealer could reduce his losses on termination by phasing
293 In other words, the harm to be considered in applying this test is limited to
that directly resulting from the termination or from a refusal to enforce the power
to terminate. The test should not be affected by whether the terminated dealer is,
because of other business interests, in a difficult financial position which will reach
crisis proportions on termination of the franchise. Likewise the financial strength of
the manufacturer should not be the basis for requiring it to retain a dealer merely
because the harm it would suffer from denying the termination is insubstantial in
comparison to its other assets (although proportional to the harm caused the dealer
by termination).
291 A similar suggestion has been made in connection with the application of
§ 2-302 to profitable bargains which, because of unforeseen or other events, reach
gross proportions: "It is conceivable that external factors may so affect the contract
that the extent of the benefit to one party was never remotely contemplated at the
time the contract was made. It is also possible that economic circumstances coerced
a party into the only agreement possible at the moment .... In such cases, a court
might be inclined to modify the contract to approximate more nearly that which the
parties could have reasonably anticipated or demanded, on the grounds that to allow a
grossly excessive profit or an unreasonably lengthy contract period would be un-
conscionable. This approach would still uphold the profitable bargain within reason-
able limits." Note, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 415 (1961). "Particularly suspect under
the [Automobile Dealers' Day-in-Court] act are conditions which benefit only, or
primarily, the manufacturer-for example, requirements that a dealer purchase large
stocks of vehicles, spare parts, special tools or advertising matter-as distinguished
from requirements that would tend to work to the mutual advantage of both
parties .... ." Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 442 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966). See Berry Bros. Buick, Inc. v. General Motors
Corp., 257 F. Supp. 542, 546 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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out his business. In other words, this test of termination effects
is designed to be a buffer against unnecessarily harsh effects of termi-
nation, not a barrier to terminations just because some economic loss
results from termination.
This proposed test of termination seems both appropriate and
practicable. Again, it has proved effective in the liquidated damages
area. In addition, comparing the harm each party to the franchise
agreement would sustain seems to be the only relevant method for
determining fairness of effects. It also seems particularly appropri-
ate in the franchise situation to insert a check on fairness at the time
of termination since these agreements commonly are long-term
arrangements, the terms of which cannot take account of all changes
arising after the agreement was executed; surrounding circumstances
may radically alter the consequences of otherwise fair termination
conditions.195 Finally, this test has the advantage of flexibility.
Applied in connection with the elastic remedy powers suggested in
the succeeding section, the courts could alleviate the harsh effects
dealers often complain of while freeing the manufacturer from an
unwanted continuing relationship.
Some examples will illustrate these points. Despite substantial
investments in merchandise, special tools, and equipment. and spare
parts inventory, franchise agreements often contain no inventory
buy-back provisions. Unfortunately such investments by the dealer
may have little value on the open market yet be of almost cost value
to that particular manufacturer. A Holiday Inn sign, for example,
probably would be of value only to other franchisees-or to the
franchisor for sale or lease to them. Allowing a franchisor to ter-
minate a franchisee under such conditions without an inventory or
advertising assets buy-back provision would seem unfair. Under
the proposed test, the court could refuse enforcement of the termina-
tion condition unless the franchisor re-purchased the inventory at
cost (or wholesale) prices. Similarly, a franchisee's motel business
may be seasonal. Termination of the motel franchise shortly before
the tourist season (and too late for the franchisor to appoint another
motel franchisee to serve that area) may produce a disproportionate
harm to the franchisee-unless the franchisor can show that a forced
continued relationship with the motel operator would cause him
similar harm such as injury to the trade name or good will. As these
215 Cf. Parev Prods. Co. v. I. Rokeach & Sons, 124 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1941).
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examples demonstrate, the proposed test, if properly applied, could
provide the courts with a means of enforcing franchise termination
conditions while, at the same time, mitigating their harshest effects.
The Remedy
In the past, when a contract provision was held unconscionable,
the relief ordered often over-compensated the abused party. The
injustice of such results may not have been disturbing when the
doctrine was limited to madman contracts or even when only gross
unfairness was involved. But if the doctrine is to apply when
the termination provisions or the effect of termination cause a dis-
proportionate loss to the. terminated party, it is imperative that the
courts be empowered to design flexible remedies meeting the par-
ticular needs of the case before them. Otherwise it can be safely
predicted that the courts will permit the doctrine of unconscion-
ability to remain in desuetude.
Once again, the framers of the Code have marked the proper
path. Formerly, application of the unconscionability doctrine meant
that the dominant party might not obtain specific enforcement of the
contract or that the disadvantaged party may have had a defense at
law. But under the Code, courts now can (1) refuse to enforce the
contract, (2) strike an unconscionable clause and enforce only the
remainder, or (3) limit the operation of the unconscionable clause
so as to eliminate its objectionable character. Courts are, in effect,
now authorized to rewrite the contract if necessary. The impact of
these provisions should not be limited to sales law.
This flexibility is important to terminated dealers because many
terminations are self-operative once notice has been given. Since
the terminating party need not enforce its decision by appeal to the
courts, the terminated party is often the supplicant for relief and
hence is not aided by the traditional equitable defense.
CONCLUSION
The expansion in the doctrine of unconscionability proposed here
to protect terminated dealers is modest. Each suggestion is grounded
in recognized contract practices which seem to have equal applica-
tion to termination situations. Termination provisions would be
enforceable only if they bear a reasonable relationship to the risks
allocated under the contract. This would mean that an investing
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dealer must be given an opportunity to recoup his investment and
that he cannot be terminated suddenly, regardless of the contract's
provisions, unless the terminating party can show a compelling
countervailing necessity. Measurement of the effect of the termina-
tion terms would be elevated to the level of a test of unconscion-
ability even when the terms seem fair on their face. The effect of
enforcing termination provisions must bear a proportional relation-
ship to the effect of denying enforcement. Finally, the remedial
tools available to the courts when unconscionability is found should
not stop short of the power to rewrite the contract because nothing
less will suffice if a fair bargain rather than punishment is to be
imposed. Equivalence, on the other hand, would not be applied as
the measure of fairness under any of these tests; rather fairness would
depend on commercial realities. Nevertheless, requiring that the
termination conditions have some relationship to the interests of
both parties would seem to be a significant step toward filling in the
outlines of "minimum decencies" in a termination context.
The recurring proposals that the right to terminate a franchised
dealer be limited by a subjective good faith test-that is, that the
terminating party act only from "pure" motives-seems analytically
unsound and practically unwise. It is analytically unsound because
there is no necessary correlation between bad motives and unfair
terminations; such a test does not insure that the burdens placed on
the terminated party are commensurate with the losses which the
terminating party might suffer if it were forced to continue the
relationship. The terminated dealer seeks relief against the harsh
effects of termination which may be unfairly placed on him, not
against the manufacturer's ill-will. Commercial realities also favor
an objective test of the relative burdens. As franchise businesses
increase in size the relationship between the dealer and manufacturer
becomes more impersonal. The manufacturer's right to terminate
should not be subject to the possibility that some personal animosity
may exist between a dealer and the manufacturer's agents.19 6 Rather,
the relevant* facts are whether the termination was commercially
justifiable (and permitted by the contract) and whether the relative
burdens resulting from it are so disproportionate as to be unfair.
196 See Macaulay 777 n.650, quoting from the brief of Ford Motor Company in
Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979
(1965).
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